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Abstract 
 
  To provide maximal disruption to a clandestine/terrorist network’s ability 
to conduct missions, we must develop a means to determine the individuals’ importance 
to the network and operations.  In a network centric world, this importance is represented 
as an additive value of their criticality across the convergence of multiple layers of 
network connections.  The connections layers of the network are comprised of social 
layers (Acquaintance, Friendship, Nuclear Family, Relatives, Student-Teacher, and 
Religious Mentors, Reverent Power and others), as well as layers representing 
interactions involving Resources, Knowledge/Skills and Temporal Local.  The social 
criticality of an individual is measured by centrality.  Event Trees and Risk Importance 
Measures are often used in a system reliability analysis to determine critical elements in 
the success or failure of operations.  The inclusion of time and location importance will 
be determined by the observation of various group members at that local.  The synergy 
gained from the application of these concepts to terror groups can be used to identify 
critical locations, resources and knowledge to their operations and can then be attributed 
to individuals connected to those essential elements.  The combination of social and 
operational criticality can then be used to identify individuals whose removal or influence 
would disrupt or diminish network operations. 
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A LAYERED SOCIAL AND OPERATIONAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
1 Introduction 
“Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there.  It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” 
 – President G.W. Bush (2001) 
1.1 Background 
 
Since September 11, 2001 the face of conflict in the United States forever changed.  
The US now faces an adversary that is more technologically advanced and globally 
focused than ever before.  The change in adversary organization, tactics and techniques 
has required the US to focus on strategies for combating terrorist organizations.  The 
Department of State defines terrorism as:  
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience” (2002: xvi). 
 
To defeat these terrorist adversaries, the US must continue to develop methods for 
destabilizing their organizations.  According to the 2006 release of the National Strategy 
for Combating Terrorism, the short term goals for the US must include the following 
(OPOTUS, 2006; 7): 
• Kill or capture terrorists 
 
• Deny them safe haven and control of any nation 
 
• Prevent them from gaining access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
 
• Render potential terrorist targets less attractive by strengthening security 
 
• Cutting off sources of funding and other resources they need to operate and 
survive. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to create an approach for contributing to a network 
analysis that will assist in identifying critical individuals within clandestine networks.  
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The criticality of these individuals will depend on their resource connections and 
contributions to or influence within the network.  Network resources will include tangible 
commodities, such as funding, and weapons or materials, while the intangible 
commodities will account for “knowledge, influence and social support” 
(Haythornthwaite, 1996). 
The ideas of tangible and intangible commodities within a network can easily be 
seen in terror attacks conducted against US military members in Afghanistan and Iraq, as 
well as other locations throughout the world.  An unconventional weapon utilized by 
terrorists in the region has been improvised explosive devices (IED).  In hope of being 
able to prevent future IED attacks, the following questions should be used to identify 
critical elements or members of such an attack: 
• Who is providing the money? – Funding is a critical element that perpetuates 
operations.  
 
• Who has explosives training? – Specialized skills are needed to build IEDs and 
train others to build them.  
 
• Who and Where are the IED materials coming from? – The originating point of 
the materials for such weapons will determine the best course of action to 
eliminate the source.  The materials may be coming from other countries, other 
organizations, or from local weapons caches.  
 
• Where are the IEDs being assembling? – The location of preparation and 
assembly of the weapons. 
 
• Who is moving the weapon materials? – Typically, the middle men transport the 
raw materials. 
 
• Who is commanding the attack and where are they meeting? – The 
organization’s leadership provides oversight and direction.  The location of their 
meetings and planning is vital.   
 
• Who is placing or detonating the weapon? – The members who conduct attacks. 
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• What key infrastructure is likely to be targeted? – The location of potential 
targets. 
 
 
The questions above provide the framework for identifying what is needed to 
destabilized the terrorist groups’ operations.  The who questions provide insight into the 
social relations between members and the resources or skills accessible to members. The 
where questions indicate the locations members frequent either for daily operations or for 
the planning and execution of an attack.  The answers to these questions provide the 
information necessary to determine the critical members of the terrorist group and how 
best to attempt to destabilize their operations.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The structure and operations of clandestine networks provide the opportunity for 
the use of various Operations Research techniques in order to gain insight into possible 
options to destabilize these networks.  The nature of secrecy among clandestine networks 
makes the collection and development of perfect data nearly impossible.  However, this 
research presents a methodology to identify critical members of a network, specifically a 
clandestine network, who if influenced or removed from the network could negatively 
impact terrorist operations or destabilize the network.  The criticality of the individual 
members is based on their social connections, the tasks they contribute to, the skills and 
materials accessible to them, and their proximity to locations of importance.  
1.3 Problem Approach 
 
The position of this research is that current methods aimed at disrupting networks 
and their operations through the group’s leadership are insufficient.  Thus, a methodology 
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which considers the collective network, to include the operations, is needed to provide 
the best opportunity to destabilize these terrorist groups.  This research provides a method 
which comprehensively analyzes a group’s members through their social and operational 
contributions.   
Though clandestine networks are not structured the same as other social networks, 
some SNA centrality measures concerned with the connections between members, rather 
than the hierarchy associated with power or influence, are appropriate for use.  The 
weighted significance of different affiliations between group members indicates the 
strength of the relationship, the distance between members or the likelihood of a 
connection.  The eigenvector centrality measures a member’s importance based on the 
importance of the people he/she is connected to and has been found to be appropriate in 
scenarios with imperfect data. The extension of the eigenvector centrality to 
multidimensional scenarios provides a means to determine the importance of tasks and 
locations associated with the network’s operations.  
An organization’s operations are comprised of multiple components which, 
predominately, work synergistically to complete tasks.  In the context of terrorist groups, 
their operations take the form of attacks against weakened states, adversary military and 
government targets, and the civilian population.  As with the preparations for any attack, 
there are potential components which will cause the attack to fail; this poses a risk to the 
terrorist group.  The reliability of these components can then be modeled probabilistically 
in an event tree to determine the comprehensive risk of failure.  Risk Importance 
Measures applied to the components of an attack identify and quantify the criticality of 
each component.  
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Finally, through a preference function, a criticality score is calculated for each 
member.  The preference function is comprised of the member’s criticality to the social 
network, operational effectiveness and location importance.  These criticality measures 
are combined via a linearly weighted sum of the three factors.  The higher the value 
calculated from a member, the more critical that member is to the operations and should 
be considered as a target for influence or removal from the network in order to destabilize 
the terrorist group and its operations.   
1.4 Research Scope 
 
The main focus of this research is on the terrorist networks that support these 
operations.  It is recognized that other clandestine organizations, such as organized crime 
syndicates, drug and human trafficking groups and street gangs require similar 
operational networks. Investigations focused on these types of organizations would also 
benefit from the methodology presented in this research.   
Additionally, this research focuses on the key operational tactics of al-Qaeda, as 
seen in recent attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq and throughout the world.  The tactics 
specifically addressed in this research include suicide bombings and improvised 
explosive devices.  Other considerations for tactics of interest include chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.       
1.5 Assumptions 
 
The assumptions incorporated into this methodology include the following: 
 
• Analysts possess the means to collect and develop the social and operational 
intelligence related to the group of interest. 
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• The data collected is as complete and accurate as possible given the time 
constraints of the analysis. 
 
• The social connections between members are undirected. 
 
• The reliability or probabilities associated with the operational components can 
be found or calculated via historical data related to similar operations or attack 
tactics or from subject matter experts.   
 
• All normalizations in this research use the one-norm. 
1.6 Thesis Organization 
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of supporting literature used in this thesis.  Topics 
included in Chapter 2 focus on clandestine organizations, Social Network Analysis 
(SNA), risk and reliability analysis, and preference functions.  Chapter 3 develops the 
methodology for determining member importance across the various layers of the 
network.  This method explores the use of Social Network Analysis centrality, 
multidimensional centrality, risk analysis through event trees and risk importance 
measure, and weighted preference functions.  Chapter 4 illustrates the methodology of 
this research by applying it to terrorist cells within al-Qaeda who were responsible for the 
US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.  Chapter 5 provides a summary 
of this research, as well as contributes potential extensions to the methods of this 
research. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the foundation of literature used in development of the 
methodology of this research.  The first focus is on organized crime and terror groups, 
their characteristics, structure, motivation, tactics, and strategies for destabilizing these 
groups.  The section focusing on Social Network Analysis (SNA) includes various 
measures used in the sociological literature to calculate the importance or influence of 
members.  The section also incorporates the use of Multi-dimensionality and Meta-
Matrices.  The next focus is on risk and its application to terrorist attacks through the use 
of event trees and risk importance measures.  The final focus is on preference functions, 
the application of an additive linear model and techniques for determining weights.  
2.2 Terrorism and Organized Crime 
 
The emergence of a new adversary requires an understanding of who they are, how 
they are structured, what their motivations are, and what their tactics are in order to create 
methods to destabilize and disrupt their efforts.  Since 2001, the US has come to 
understand that these new adversaries are unlike those of this nation’s past; they are not a 
state to be attacked, they are not an army that can be distinguished from the civilian 
populace, their physical boundaries are limitless, their tactics are unconventional and 
their operations are supported by modern technology and connectivity unheard of in the 
past. The current focus of the US is on “transnational extremist organizations, networks 
and individuals” (OPOTUS, 2006: 5). These transnational threats, which compromise the 
security of the US, consist of terrorists groups, organized crime syndicates, the trafficking 
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of drugs and illegal aliens and the smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
(National Defense University, 1999:245).   
While the adversary is more difficult to discern from the civilian population, these 
covert or clandestine networks behave differently than most social networks (Baker and 
Faulkner, 1993: 843).  The characteristics of a clandestine organization, which 
distinguish it from civilian social networks, are identified by three factors (McCormick 
and Owen, 2000:177): 
1. Group Size – The number of members in each cell and the number of cells 
2. Group Structure -   The number and nature of communications/relations between 
the group’s cells.  
 
3. Group Location – The cells location in proximity to adversary’s center of 
gravity. 
 
These characteristics aid the group in their ability to draw attention to their operations.  
The ability to control the group’s size, structure and location, create the opportunity to 
effectively work undetected.   
 Clandestine networks, terrorist or otherwise, depend on the secrecy for existence.  
McCormick and Owen suggest that the “survival” of such an organization depends on 
their “invisibility” (2000: 175).  They suggest this can be accomplished one of two ways, 
through the “organizational capacity…or level of operational security” (McCormick and 
Owen, 2000:175-176).  Rules too stringent on the size of the group or the procedures for 
operational security (OPSEC), severely limit the successfulness of the group.  Therefore a 
balance between secrecy and operational communications is vital (Baker and Faulkner, 
1993: 843).   
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 While the motivations of the terrorist groups and organized criminals differ, the 
similarities between them enable analysis methods to be applied with limited differences.  
This is due to the nature of the organizations and their operations methods, as they are 
more similar than different (Sanderson, 2004:49).  Through various sources, Sanderson 
has compiled several similarities between terrorist groups and organized criminal groups, 
as seen in Table 1 (2004: 53). 
Table 1 - Characteristics of Organized Crime and Terrorist Groups (Sanderson, 2004: 53) 
Descriptors Actions
▪ Are rational actors ▪ Use violence or threat of 
reprisal
▪ Have "interchangeable" 
recruitment pool
▪ Use kidnapping, assassination 
and extortion
▪ Are adaptive, innovative and 
resilient
▪ Pose asymmetrical threat to US 
and allies
▪ Have back-up leaders and foot 
soldiers
▪ Members rarely allowed to 
leave, often fatal 
▪ Secret Operations, Covert ▪ Defy the state and rule of law 
(unless state sponsored)
▪ Provide social services in 
community
Similarities between Organized Crime and Terror 
 
2.2.1 Structure 
 
To understand these clandestine groups, knowledge of this underlying structure is 
imperative to providing insights.  Since groups of terrorist and/or organized crime are 
different, the strategies for dealing with each will vary.  The structure of terror, as 
described in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, is comprised of five 
components seen in Figure 1 (OPOTUS, 2003: 6).     
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Figure 1 - Structure of Terror (OPOTUS, 2003: 6) 
 
These underlying conditions are based on the real and perceived grievances of the group.  
The international environment and states are related in the role of enabling the group to 
operate knowingly or in being unstable enough for the group to operate without 
resistance. The organization is meant to carry out the strategies and direction of the 
leaders.   
The components of the terror structure are not unique to terror groups; they can be 
seen in organized crime as well.  Crime groups consist of “complex, clandestine, 
hierarchically organized networks” (National Defense University, 1999: 256).  
Corruption is an effective mechanism to continue operations unhampered in portions of 
the US and abroad.  This corruption can thrive only in an areas were government officials 
and police can be influenced (National Defense University, 1999: 250).   
Unlike the hierarchically structure of organized crime groups, the new terror groups 
work in clusters or cells.  This “compartmentalized” structure refers to the distinct tasks, 
operations and logistics support (Sageman, 2004: 170).  Members of a specific cell are 
often highly inter-connected, but have limited connections beyond the cell (Sageman, 
2004:170; Krebs, 2002: 46-49).  This structure is effective for a number of reasons.  The 
first being the “minimized damage” to the total network should a single cell be 
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jeopardized (Krebs, 2002: 46).  Another benefit to the organization is the difficulties 
associated “identifying, locating and eradicating” small, highly dispersed cells (National 
Defense University, 1999: 249).     
As mentioned in the previous section, the OPSEC practices of a group complement 
the structure of the organization.  OPSEC measures provide guidance for members with 
regard to topics that can be discussed, means of communications, protection of identity, 
and security practices associated with various aspects of operations.  The al-Qaeda 
Training Manual describes the security measures for the use of forged identification, safe 
houses, methods of communication, means of transportation, and codes or ciphers for 
encrypting messages (Post, 2005).  Though these protective measures are extensive, they 
are also dynamic; they must continue to adapt their security as their adversary threatens 
the organizations operational success.  
2.2.2 Small-World Theory 
 
The six degrees of separation concept is familiar to most analysts and even those 
outside of the mathematical and scientific communities.  Its popularity is attributed to 
Stanley Milgram, whose research in the mid-1960’s produced the theory that people of 
the world are interconnected through a maximum of six other people.  Granovetter 
describes a world in which personal relations are either strong ties or weak ties (1973: 
1360).  The strong ties correspond to one’s close relations, family, friends, or co-workers.  
The weak ties are the relations we spend limited time with, acquaintances.   
A world built only on strong ties, creates many isolated groups.  It is only the 
addition of the weak ties to a network that limits the separations between the 
interconnected clusters (Buchanan, 2002: 55).   The density of the strong ties in a cluster 
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makes the removal of such a relation nearly ineffective, however the removal of a weak 
tie has the potential to detach otherwise isolated groups (Buchanan, 2002: 41-42).  This 
concept is especially interesting in the context of destabilizing network operations.   
There are two essential pieces to these large networks, hubs and weak ties.  First, 
the individuals who are well connected within a large network typically create a link 
between isolates (Sageman, 2004: 164).  These hubs are essential to the network, as 
communications must pass through them to get to the isolates, thus creating 
“vulnerabilities” within the network (Sageman, 2004:164, 141).  Second, weak ties 
provide the opportunity for recruitment into the group.  Without these weak ties the 
isolated groups of family and friends would join without the potential for outsiders to also 
join (Sageman, 2004: 169).   
While the hubs create an opportunity to impact the networks, especially if the 
removal of multiple hubs were considered at the same time, there are few options 
available to compensate for weak ties. These weak ties generally result from chance 
meetings and may not be commanded by the leaders, which adds a level complexity 
when trying to break those ties.  If, however, known locations or occasions exist for 
recruiting (i.e. particular meetings, a specific conference, or a specific mosque or church) 
the observation and detection of weak ties may be improved.  An additional complication 
resulting from the clandestine nature of the group is the appearance of weak ties where 
strong ties actually exist (Krebs, 2002:49).   
2.2.3 Motivation 
 
Terrorist groups and organized crime groups differ significantly in their goals and 
motivation for their cause.  The focus of criminal groups is money; the trafficking of 
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drugs or people, the money laundering, and the corruption are a means to generate more 
money (National Defense University, 1999: 249-250).  While the terrorists participate in 
similar activities to generate funds, this is a necessity to achieve their religious and 
ideological goals (National Defense University, 1999: 256; Sanderson, 2004: 55).    
The ideological goals of the jihadist terrorist groups are meant to further separate 
the Muslim and Non-Muslim communities throughout the world (OPOTUS, 2006: 5).  As 
seen most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, the goals have been to “overthrow civil order 
and replace freedom with conflict and intolerance” (OPOTUS, 2006: 5).  Specifically, al-
Qaeda has three primary goals (Moghaddam, 2006: 4-6): 
1. Complete US withdraw from the Muslim region 
 
2. Halt of US support to Israel 
 
3. Halt to US support and manipulation of countries like Saudi Arabia and other in 
the region 
 
Only once these motivations are understood, can the US and its allies combat these 
terrorists.   
2.2.4 Tactics  
 
Understanding the tactics of a group provide insight which allow opportunities to 
be developed to defeat the group.  The tactics implored by a group are determined by the 
personnel and materials within their control.  The motivation of the group is also an 
indicator of the type of tactics the group is likely to use.   
As mentioned in the previous section, organized crime groups operate utilizing 
corruption to create the environment for illegal financial activities.  When coercion or 
bribery is ineffective, assassination is used (National Defense University, 1999:250).  
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Economic and industrial espionage, bank fraud, financial market manipulation, and 
counterfeiting are aided by electronic fund transfers and further promote the financial 
goals of the groups (National Defense University, 1999:250).  
The tactics employed by terror groups focus on creating a conducive environment 
and operational opportunities aimed at achieving their goals.  First, the groups prey on 
states with struggling governments.  The weakened states lack the capability to resist the 
terrorists.  The unstable environment allows terrorists to create networks of safe houses, 
logistics trails, and a population to begin recruiting (Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002: 98).  
Next, the tactics, with respect to the operations, include decisions about target selection 
and weapons selection.  Attacks focus on government and political buildings, financial, 
religious and large public areas, and the people in these areas.  These attacks may be 
carried out by suicide bombings, conventional weapons, improvised explosive devices, 
and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. The targets are selected to 
destabilize weakened states and spread fear among the targeted population.   
The number of suicide bombings across the world has increased dramatically, 
especially in Afghanistan (Department of the State, 2006; Maples, 2007).  Suicide 
bombings are meant to instill fear in the public and coerce the government/adversary to 
comply (Pape, 2003:344).  Suicide bombings are a tactic of choice for groups with 
limited resources (Moghaddam, 2006: 123).  They are inexpensive, except for human 
capital, yet highly effective – making a “suicide terrorists the ultimate smart bomb” 
(Hoffman, 2003) or the “guided missiles of poor armies” (Moghaddam, 2006: 125).  
Explosive devices can be either conventional weapons or improvised from a 
number of sources such as munitions, home made explosives or some combination of 
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easily available explosives.  The conventional munitions include small arms, rocket 
propelled grenades, and so forth.  The improvised explosive devices (IED) are often 
home made from either advanced or rudimentary materials.  The IEDs may be more 
substantial if supplied by a third party group. The IEDs can be implanted, in the open or 
placed in vehicles; they may be pressure, time, command wire or remote sensor 
detonated; they may be individual or linked together (daisy-chain) (MNF-I, 2007). 
The chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are one of the 
nation’s most significant concerns (OPOTUS, 2006: 7).  There are various sources of 
chemical and biological agents, with numerous means of deployment.  Radiological and 
nuclear materials are likely to surface as a “dirty bomb”, as rudimentary materials are 
“more accessible and less expensive” (Stanislawski and Hermann, 2004) and do not 
require the advanced skills need to arm a nuclear warhead.   
2.2.5 Disrupt/Destabilize 
 
Ultimately the efforts attributed to understanding the structure, motivations, and 
tactics of a group are used to disrupt or destabilize the network.  Carley et al. suggest that 
destabilization occurs when the resources, communications, and workload are impacted 
(2003: 4).  People who are well connected, the hubs, are ideal choices (Carley et al., 
2003:4; Klerks, 2001:62).  Another option is to target those who attain expertise or 
provide goods (Carley et al., 2003:4; Klerks, 2001:62, Krebs, 2002:50).   
2.3 Social Network Analysis 
 
The study of social networks has evolved since the early 1930’s and has come to 
incorporate the sciences of anthropology, social theory, mathematics, statistics, and 
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computers (Wasserman and Faust; 1994: 10) and more recently, operations research.  
Foundations of this growing field are based in the theory and notation of graphs, 
sociometrics and algebra (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 69-82).  There are three topics of 
particular interest, which can be answered through Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
(Tichy et al., 1979: 509): 
1. Transactional Content:  The “exchange” between members, 
2. Nature of Links:  The “strength and quality” of connection between members, 
3. Structural Characteristics:  The “pattern of relations” among members. 
An important aspect of SNA as opposed to other approaches, is the focus on the 
“structure of the network” instead of the “characteristics of the individuals” in the 
network (Ressler; 2006).   
The remainder of this section is focused on specific measures, applications of, and 
advances in SNA.  Centrality provides a means to determine a network member’s 
importance.  Multidimensional centrality applies a centrality measure across network 
layers or time and location information associated with a network.  Finally, advances in 
data representation for analysis beyond simply the social ties within a network are 
available via meta-matrices.   
2.3.1 Centrality 
 
There is no standard, nor overarching agreement between those in the social 
network community as to what constitutes centrality or even how it is quantified 
(Freeman, 1979: 217).   Centrality has been known as several concepts over the years, 
including: prestige, influence, prominence, importance.  Roughly, centrality is associated 
with members who are near the “structural center” of a network and are typically seen as 
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being in a special position (Freeman, 1979: 218).  The type of network or graph 
determines the measure of centrality considered most appropriate.  The concepts and 
terms important in networks, graphs, and centrality are included in Table 2 (West, 
2001:520-532). 
Table 2 - Graph Theory terms for SNA 
Term Definition Example
Directed An edge or set of edges, which designate a head and a tail
Undirected 
An edge or set of edges, which 
does not distinguish a head or 
tail
Weighted An assigned value of distance 
or strength to an edge
Unweighted
An edges whose weight is one; 
edges without a value are 
assumed to be one
Symmetric Implies if A can reach B, that B 
can reach A equally
Asymmetric Does not assume that A and B 
can be reached equally
A B
A B
A B.53
A B
A B
1
A B
A B
or
.24
.76
 
 
The centrality measures use several other terms, which must be examined in order 
to define and calculate each measure.  Adjacency describes a connection between to 
members.  Degree is based on the number of members to which a specific member is 
adjacent.  A path identifies a sequence of adjacencies between two members via 
intermediary members.  Distance is the number of adjacencies in a path. Finally, a 
geodesic is a path with the shortest distance.  With the understanding of these terms, 
degree, closeness, betweenness, information centralities can be defined.  This section also 
discusses are eigenvector centrality and Katz’s influence measure.  
The basics of degree centrality are found in the definition of degree.  Freeman 
explains degree centrality as an individual who is highly “visible” or is in a position with 
the “potential for activity”.  Degree centrality is typically applied to undirected graphs 
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and since the measure is based on the simple adjacency, weighting on the edges are 
disregarded; though can be used as in-degree or out-degree for directed graphs.  This 
measure is seen as the ability for a person to influence those directly connected to them 
(Borgatti, 2005: 62).  Hence a person with many connections will have a higher score 
than one with few connections.  An individual’s degree centrality can be calculated via 
Equation (2.1); the column sum of an adjacency matrix (Wasserman and Faust; 1994: 
178). 
 D ij
j
C x= ∑  (2.1)  
Sade argues that 1-step degree centrality does not contain enough information about the 
relationships of a network; 2 or 3-step in-degree, up to paths of no more than 10 should 
instead be considered (1989: 281).  
Closeness provides a measure based on an individual’s distance to all other 
members of the network (Sabidussi, 1966: 587-588).  The measure will have varied 
results based on the directedness, weighting, and symmetry of the graph.  Borgatti asserts 
that low scores indicate a shorter distance between members, also corresponding to the 
individuals most likely to receive information the soonest (2005: 59).  This closeness is 
scored as the inverse of the sum of the shortest path from a member to all others, as 
depicted in Equation (2.2); here d(ni, nj) represents the distance from member i to 
member j and g is the number of members in the group (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 
184).   
 ( ) ( )
1
,
1
g
C i i j
j
C n d n n
−
=
 
=  
 
∑  (2.2)  
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Betweenness, while similar to closeness, utilizes the shortest paths between all 
members.  The calculation accounts for the proportion of times member k is an 
intermediary on the shortest paths between all members i and j to the total number of 
shortest paths between the all members.  A high betweenness value for a member 
indicates a potential for influence on the interactions between members, who are 
dependent on intermediaries for connections (Wasserman and Faust, 2001: 188) or have 
the “control” to “shut off” communication flow (Borgatti, 2005: 60).  Again, the 
directedness, symmetry and weighting of the graph will limit the possible paths and thus 
the value a member earns.  The calculation for betweenness is seen in Equation (2.3) 
(Wasserman and Faust; 1994: 190).  
 ( ) ( )jk iB i
j k jk
g n
C n
g<
 
=   
 
∑   (2.3) 
Information centrality is yet another measure similar to closeness and betweenness.  
However, it is purported that information and communications do not adhere to a short 
path to flow through a network (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989: 3).  Information centrality 
differs in that it accounts for the number of times member k is on any path between 
members i and j, not just the shortest path.  For an unweighted graph, Equation (2.6) 
determines an individual’s information centrality (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989: 12).  The 
matrix B = (bij) is based on (2.4) and (2.5). 
 
0  p oints  and  are incident
1   otherwiseij
i j
b = 

 (2.4)  
{1  degree of point iib i= +  (2.5)  
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Let ( ) 1,  ,  ij jj ij
j j
C c B T c R c−= = = =∑ ∑ .  Then, the information centrality of member i is 
given in Equation (2.6).  
 
( ) 12
i ii
T R
I c
n
−
− 
= + 
 
 (2.6)  
An alteration made for weighted graphs is seen in (2.7) (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989: 
14). 
 
( )1  weight of line connecting points  and  
1   if p oints  and  are not adjacentij
i j
b
i j
−
= 

 (2.7)  
Hamill suggests using caution with this centrality measure, as a flaw in the counting of all 
possible paths creates a difference in values based on a heuristic and the above method; 
he also explains that using all possible paths as given in the problem definition by 
Stephenson and Zelen, corrects the error (2006: 304). 
Finally, the eigenvector centrality developed by Bonacich et al. considers a 
member’s importance based on the importance of the members to whom he is connected.   
Definition 1: Let A be an n by n matrix.  Then an eigenvalue is a scalar, λ, 
associated with a non-trivial solution (where x ≠ 0) to the equation Ax xλ=  
(Kincaid and Cheney, 2002: 255). 
 
Definition 2: The non-zero vector, x, which satisfies Ax xλ= is the 
eigenvector of A corresponding to the eigenvalue λ (Kincaid and Cheney, 
2002: 255). 
 
Equation (2.8) represents the eigenvector calculation, were A is the adjacency matrix, λ is 
the largest positive eigenvalue, and v is the eigenvector associated with the largest 
eigenvalue (Bonacich, 1987: 1172).   
 v Avλ =  (2.8) 
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For this method of centrality to be applied to asymmetric graphs, the addition of an 
attenuation factor ( )1/α λ<  and e as a vector of ones, the resulting calculation is (2.9)
(Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001: 196). 
 ( ) 1Tv I A eα −= −  (2.9) 
Newman expanded this method to incorporate the use of edge weights in the matrix in 
place of the one, representing adjacency (2004: 056131-2).  This concept has been 
associated with PageRank, an algorithm used by search engines on the internet to rank 
sites based on the importance of the site links imbedded in a specific page (Newman, 
2004: 056131-2).  
As early as 1953, Katz established a measure meant to determine one’s “status, 
influence or transmission of information” (1953: 39).  This measure hinges on an 
attenuation factor, which Katz describes as attributing a “lower effectiveness of longer 
chains”; providing long paths with smaller values (1953: 40).  This attenuation factor, α, 
is found via the largest eigenvalue (λ1) for the adjacency matrix C.  Then 1
α
is the integer 
on the interval 1 1
1 2λ λ
α
≤ ≤  (Katz, 1953: 42).  In this construction, s is also needed, the 
column vector of row sums of C’, such that 's C u= ; where u is a vector of ones.  
Equation (2.10) shows the individual contributions to the influence measure (Kats, 1953: 
41).  
 
11
't I C s
α
−
 
= − 
 
 (2.10) 
This vector is then scaled by the constant m, as in (2.11) (Katz, 1953: 42). 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )111 ! nm n e αα −= −  (2.11)  
The Katz influence measure is given by the product 1 t
m
. 
2.3.2 Multidimensional Centrality 
 
Bonacich et al. determined a method for incorporating triad relationships, time, and 
location into social network studies.  Utilizing the basic eigenvector centrality, the 
method can analyze relations across multiple dimensions (Bonacich et al., 2004: 189).  
Bonacich et al., use adjacency matrices or node-arc incidence matrices depending on the 
data and objective of the analysis.  A node-arc incidence matrix creates a row based on a 
single connection, while the columns represent the members.  A row is filled by placing a 
one in columns corresponding to those with the connection, and zero is the remaining 
columns.  Bonacich et al. augments the adjacency or incidence matrices to include time 
and location information. 
Figure 2 shows a set of relationships between four members, at three separate 
points in time.   
A B
C D
Time 1
A B
C D
Time 2
A B
C D
Time 3
 
Figure 2 - Four Members at Three Points in Time 
 
The corresponding augmented node-arc incidence matrix is represented in Table 3.  
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Table 3 - Four Member/Three Times Matrix 
A B C D 1 2 3
A-B 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
A-C 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
B-D 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
C-D 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
A-B 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
A-C 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
A-D 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
B-D 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
A-C 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
A-D 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
B-C 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
B-D 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
TimeMembers
 
 
Let the matrix in Table 3 equal E, then let TA E E= and find the eigenvector associated 
with the largest eigenvalue of A.  The eigenvector and normalized eigenvector of member 
and time importance are shown in Table 4.  These results show that member A holds the 
highest centrality score and that Time 3 was most important.   
Table 4 - Multi-Dimensional Centrality Score 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
Normalized 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
A 0.52 0.30
B 0.43 0.25
C 0.34 0.20
D 0.43 0.25
1 0.30 0.29
2 0.28 0.28
3 0.44 0.43
Members
Time
 
 
2.3.3 Meta-Matrix 
 
Carley has created a method for depicting the many diverse aspects of a network 
through the use of meta-matrices.  A meta-matrix conveniently combines the inter-
relationships between the members, knowledge, resources, tasks and organization 
affiliation (2001, 2002).   A variety of measures can be applied to the various submatrices 
within the meta-matrix (Carley, 2001: 1).  Table 5 depicts a meta-matrix with the 
components of importance to this research (Carley et al., 2006: 85).   
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Table 5 - Meta-Matrix Relations (Carley, 2001: 2) 
Member Knowledge Resources Tasks
Communications 
Network
Knowledge 
Network 
Capabilities 
Network
Assignment 
Network
Who knows who Who knows what Who has what 
resource
Who does what
Information 
Network Training Network
Knowledge 
Requirements 
Network
What informs what
What knowledge is 
need to use which 
resource
What knowledge is 
needed to do the 
task
Resource 
Substitution 
Network
Resource 
Requirements 
Network
What resources can 
be substituted for 
which
What resources are 
needed to do that 
task
Precedence 
Network 
Which task must be 
done before which
Member
Knowledge
Resources
Tasks
 
Carley suggests four measures likely to destabilize terrorist networks:  degree, 
betweenness, cognitive load, and task exclusivity (2003: 5).   The meta-matrix analysis 
software developed by the Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational System 
is Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) which calculates each of the measures in Table 5 
provides a brief definition, sub-matrix used, and explanation of the calculation for each 
measure of interest (Carley, 2002:5; 2004: 18-29).   
Table 6 - ORA Measures using Meta-Matrices 
Measure Definition Sub-Matrix Calculation Reference
Degree 
Centrality
Number of 
connections 
member has
M/M Normalized row or column sums 
Carley and 
Reminga 
(2004: 30)
Betweenness 
Centrality
The proportion of 
shortest paths that 
use a member as an 
intermediary
M/M Normalized Equation (2.3)
Carley and 
Reminga 
(2004: 30)
Cognitive Load/ 
Demand
Amount of effort 
expended to 
complete a task
M/R & R/T  or    
M/K & K/T
Average of 6 measures based on (M/T * 
R/T') or (M/T * M/T')
Carley and 
Reminga 
(2004: 22)
Task Exclusivity
Detects members 
who exclusively 
perform tasks
M/T
Carley and 
Reminga 
(2004: 28)
M/M - Member/Member, M/K - Member/Knowledge, M/T - Member/Task,       
M/R - Member/Resource, R/T - Resource/Task, K/T - Knowledge/Task
( ) ( )( )( )
1
, *exp 1 :,
T
j
MT i j sum MK j
=
−∑
 
2.4 Modeling Operations with Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
 
While many in the US and other nations are using risk analysis to minimize the 
impact of terrorist attacks, viewing attacks or operations from the perspective of the 
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terrorist groups provides additional opportunities for analysis.  Due to limited resources 
available to terror groups and their desire to conduct successful attacks, the concepts of 
extreme events can be applied, as a failure would be considered an “unacceptable risk” 
(Haimes, 2004: 300).  This can be attributed to any number of components which 
contribute to the success or failure of their operations.  Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) 
can be applied to: system analysis, containment analysis and/or consequence analysis.   
2.4.1 Risk 
 
The Department of Defense defines risk as the “probability and severity of loss 
linked to hazards” (DoD Dictionary, 2001).  Kaplan and Garrick consider the following 
as the basis for their definition, Risk = Uncertainty + Damage (1981:12).  Risk is an area 
of research widely applied across various disciplines, such as system and human 
reliability and project management (Bedford and Cooke, 2001; Høyland and Rausand, 
1994).  These disciplines are most concerned with the uncertainty of events and 
mitigation measures taken to reduce the threat or risk.   
Kaplan and Garrick define risk as a triplet, Equation (2.12): 
 { }, ,i i iR S L X=   (2.12) 
Si represents a risk scenario, Li is the likelihood of the scenario and Xi  is the outcome 
associated with the scenario (1981: 13).  To better enable identification of all possible 
risk scenarios associated with a system or project, Kaplan and Garrick suggest the 
following questions (1981: 13): 
What can go wrong?  
How likely is it to happen?  
What are the consequences?  
i
i
i
S
L
X
→
→
→
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The risk triplet can be applied to the context of group operations.  The risk scenarios in 
this study are associated with the reliability, availability or quality of materials, the 
availability or level of expertise and the possibility of detection or interference by the 
adversary.  The likelihood is a probability associated with success or level of the 
materials, expertise and/or adversary actions.  Finally, the consequences are considered in 
terms of system or operations success or failure.   The cause of a failure is described later.   
2.4.2 Event Tree/Reliability 
 
Event trees provide the framework for the visualization of “forward logic” 
(Bedford and Cooke, 2001: 99).  The tree begins with an initiating event and grows as 
combinations of system influencing components are incorporated (Bedford and Cooke, 
2001: 99).  The components are modeled sequentially, allowing the outcome likelihoods 
to be quantified (Papazoglou, 1998: 169-170).  Figure 3 shows an example of an Event 
Tree, which will be used through the remainder of this section to explain concepts and 
analysis techniques. 
Event Base A B Outcome Likelihood
r1 X1 p1*r1
p1
r2 X2 p1*r2
r3 X3 p1*r3
p2 X4 p2
p1+p2=1 r1+r2+r3=1
Initiating Event
a2
b1
b2
b3
a1
 
Figure 3 - Example of an Event Tree 
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The basic concepts and terms used in the discussion of event trees are summarized in 
Table 7.  The basic events may correspond to elements of a physical process, human 
actions or responses to a question (Papazoglou, 1998: 170).  Since the branches of the 
tree are exhaustive and represent the possible outcomes of each basic event, the paths are 
considered mutually exclusive; that is, there are no two paths that lead to the same 
outcome (Papazoglou, 1998:175).   
Table 7 - Event Tree Terms & Definitions 
Event Tree Element Definitions Example Source
Papazaglou, 1998
Basic Event (ei) Components wich decribe all possible things that can happen A 170
Event Base (E)
Collection of events, whose outcomes 
completely describe the outcomes of a 
system 
(A, B) 171
Joint Event (e) Product of basic events; e = e1 * e2 A * B 171
Outcome of Event (ω) Result of a basic event X4 170
Outcome Space (W) The distinct and finite set of all possible 
outcomes W={X1,X2, X3, X4} 170
Partition of Outcome 
Space
The set of disjoint subsets which represent 
W W=P1(W) U P2(W) 171
Path of Event Tree Collection of branchs corresponding to an 
outcome (a1, b1) or a2 175
 
 
The terms in Table 7 provide the foundation needed to discus methods for reducing the 
outcome space into collections of similar outcomes instead of all possible outcomes 
(Papazoglou, 1998: 169-170).   
Two topics important to the reduction of the outcome space are cylinder sets and 
cylinder paths.   
Definition 3: Let E be an event base with N basic events, ei (i=1,2,…,N) with 
corresponding event-outcome spaces Wi (i=1,2,…N) and the outcome space 
W.  Also, let Wi be partitioned in the following manner 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 ...i i i j iW P W P W P W= ∪ ∪ ∪ .   
Then a Cylinder Set is: { } ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 2 2 ...i j N k NC P W P W P Wω ω ω ω= = ∈ ∧ ∈ ∧ ∧ ∈ ; were 
∧  is the conjunction operator (Papazoglou, 1998: 172).   
 
A cylinder set represents a “generalized outcome” of a joint event, e (Papazoglou, 1998: 
172).  Papazoglou also explains that since a cylinder set contains distinct outcomes of the 
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outcome space, W, which are contained in respective subsets, cylinder sets are mutually 
exclusive (1998:172).   
Definition 4: A cylinder path is a subset of paths corresponding to a cylinder 
set of the outcome space (Papazoglou, 1998: 175). 
 
A cylinder path represents a “generalized outcome” of basic events, which is restricted by 
the subsets of the corresponding outcome spaces (Papazoglou, 1998: 176).  Thus an 
outcome space of a joint event is partitioned into subsets creating mutually exclusive 
cylinder sets.  The paths corresponding to the cylinder set can then be reduced to the 
cylinder paths.   
Since the likelihoods of events are expressed as probabilities, the cylinder sets and 
paths provide the opportunity to utilize probabilistic properties.  Specifically, for an 
outcome space, [ ] 1P W = .  In addition, since the paths are mutually exclusive, then 
[ ] [ ] [ ]P A B P A P B∪ = + .  Thus, for a cylinder set [ ] ;   i j j i
j
P C P Cω ω = ∀ ∈ ∑ .     
Applying the concept of cylinder sets and cylinder paths to Figure 3, the following 
assumptions are made: for basic event A, p1 + p2 = 1 and for basic event B,  
r1 + r2 + r3 = 1.  Let cylinder set, C1 = {X1, X2} be a success (S) and C2 = {X3, X4} be a 
failure (F).  The new event tree is then depicted in Figure 4 . 
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Event Base A B Outcome Likelihood
r1 S p1*r1
p1
r2 S p1*r2
r3 F p1*r3
p2 F p2
p1+p2=1 r1+r2+r3=1
Initiating Event
a2
b1
b2
b3
a1
 
Figure 4 - Reduced Outcome Space Event Tree 
  
2.4.3 Risk Importance Measures 
 
Risk importance measures provide a quantitative means to determine a 
component’s impact on the reliability of the overall system (van der Boorst and 
Schoonakker, 2001: 241).  The two main categories of measures include: 1) a 
component’s contribution to maintaining the current system reliability, and 2) the 
improvement to the system reliability given the improvement of a specific component.   
Table 8 provides definitions and calculations from the literature for the importance 
measures were xi = 0 indicates a no failure and xi = 1 indicates a failure. 
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Table 8 - Risk Importance Measures  
Importance Measures Definition Equation Source
Risk Reduciton 
Difference between current 
system reliability and the 
reliability when component i  is 
completely reliable
Vesely et al ., 
1983:5
Risk Reduciton Worth
Ratio of current system reliability 
and reliability with a perfect 
component i
Pottonen, 2005:91
Fussell-Vesely Identifies the component most likely to cause a system failure
Vesely et al ., 
1983:7
Risk Achievement
Difference between current 
system reliability and the 
reliability when component i  is 
completely unreliable
Vesely et al ., 
1983:3
Risk Achievement Worth
Ratio of system reliability with an 
imperfect component i  and 
current system reliability
Pottonen, 2005:91
Birbaum's Measure
Reliability importance of 
component i ; independent of 
current state
van der Borst and 
Schoonakker, 
2001:242
( ) ( )0i iRR P F P F x= − =
( )
( )0i i
P F
RRW
P F x
=
=
( )
( )
1i
i
P F x
RAW
P F
=
=
( ) ( )1i iRA P F x P F= = −
( ) ( )
( )
0i
i
P F P F x
FV
P F
− =
=
( ) ( )1 1i i iBI P F x P F x= = − =
 
 
For all measures, ( )P F  is the probability of system failure under the current reliability of 
components, ( )0iP F x =  is the conditional probability of system failure, given 
component i will never fail and ( )1iP F x =  is the conditional probability of system 
failure given component i will always fail. 
 
While these measures prove useful individually, it is suggested that the 
combination of measures provided the best insight into the contributions of individual 
components and the overall system reliability, as different measure provide different 
information (Vesely et al., 1983: 1; van der Boorst and Schoonakker, 2001: 242).  
Caution should be exercised in choosing which measure to use, as some measures are 
inter-related; as seen in Equations (2.13) - (2.15).  
 ( )
RRFV
P F
=  (2.13)  
 
1
1
RRW
FV
=
−
 (2.14)  
 1( )
RARAW
P F
= +  (2.15)  
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2.5 Preference Functions 
 
Preference functions provide a quantitative means to attribute a score to a set of 
alternatives.  Through this research, the alternatives of interest correspond to the 
members of the network.  A preference function separates the measure into parts, 
determines a value of the parts and then integrates the parts (Keeney, 1992:132-133).   
2.5.1 Additive Linear Preference Model 
 
Though the proxies for social importance, risk importance and spatial importance, 
are likely not mutually exclusive, Stewart suggests an additive linear preference model is 
still appropriate for use (1991:19).  The linear preference functions are comprised of two 
components: the criticality proxies and weights.  While normally calculated via single-
dimensional value functions, the proxies used in this research are found by other 
methods.  Finally, weights are needed to attribute a relative importance between the 
values of the linear model.  The resulting function is represented in Equation (2.16) (von 
Winderfeldt and Edwards, 1986: 276). 
 ( ) i i
i
v x w v= ∑   (2.16) 
The weights needed, can be determined via a number of methods. These methods 
are categorized by Numerical Estimation Methods and Indifference Methods (von 
Winderfeldt and Edwards, 1986: 277-278). The following sections provide the 
explanation calculation for various weighting methods.    
2.5.2 Weighting Techniques 
 
Various weighting schemes are available to be employed, depending on the 
resources available and the urgency of the results.  Some methods involve varied amounts 
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of inputs from Subject Matter Experts (SME), while others can be developed via 
available data.  The weighting techniques in which SME inputs are necessary will focus 
on rating and rank methods, while those using data will incorporate proportions.   
SMEs are a valuable asset for providing insight, however a drawback to using SME 
information lies in the differences of opinion between different SMEs.  Methods of 
weight rating which are heavily reliant on SME inputs and thus specific to that SME are 
direct rating, Simple Multiattribute Rating Technique (SMART) and the Max100 point 
allocation.  It is argued by Bottomley et al. that direct rating techniques produce linearly 
related weights where as point allocation methods produce non-linearly related weights 
(2000: 553).   
One alternative for calculating weights is direct rating.  A SME ranks the options, 
giving the lowest a score of zero and the highest a score of 100.  The options in between 
are assigned a value between zero and 100.  A consistency check is done comparing all 
options pairwise to determine the final weights, which are then normalized.  von 
Winderfeldt and Edwards highlight that direct rating is seldom used, but offer the 
dispersion of a total of 100 points across the attributes as an alternative method (1986: 
274-275).  An easier version of this method requires only that a SME allocate a total of 
100 points among all options relative to the importance placed on each option. 
The swing weights presented by Kirkwood are adapted from Edward’s SMART 
(1997: 53).  This procedure requires significant inputs from the SME, as the relative 
importance for each attribute must be determined.  The procedure is outlined in the 
following four steps (Kirkwood: 1997: 70): 
1.  Rank the attributes from least important to most. 
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2. Assigning the lowest importance attribute a value k, scale the remaining 
attributes as a multiple of the lowest. 
 
3. Sum the values, set equal to one and solve for k. 
 
4. The value of k should then be multiplied by the scaling numbers to obtain the 
weight of each attribute.   
 
Max100 is a method of ratio estimation weighting, which relies on the SMEs 
perception of attribute importance relative to that considered most important.  The 
Max100 method applies similar techniques to those used in SMARTS.  The procedure is 
outlined by Bottomley and Doyle (2001: 555): 
1.  The attributes are ranked according to importance. 
 
2.   A value of 100 is assigned to the attribute considered most important.   
 
3.   The remaining attributes are then given a value between zero and 99, as a relative 
importance to the most important attribute.   
 
4.   Score are normalized.  
 
Bottomley and Doyle offer the observation that the consistency of alternative ranking 
based on the results from the Max100 weighting in testing displayed fewer rank reversals 
(2001: 559).   
Two weighting methods requiring less SME inputs involve only an ordinal ranking 
of attributes.  The most important attribute is assigned one, such that R1 = 1, R2 =2,…, Rn 
= n.  The Rank Reciprocal (RR) rule is shown in Equation (2.17) (von Winderfeldt and 
Edwards, 1986: 284). 
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Another rank based weighting method is the Rank Sum (RS), seen in Equation (2.18) 
(von Winderfeldt and Edwards, 1986: 284): 
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For the simple case of three and six attributes, as seen in this research, Figure 5 and 
Figure 6 depicts the calculated weights.  The Rank Sum weights appear linear, while the 
Rank Reciprocal weights are piece-wise linear, giving more importance to the higher 
ranked attributes.  A choice between these two methods should reflect the perceived 
importance of the attributes from the SME.   
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Figure 5 - 3 Attribute Comparison of RR and RS 
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Figure 6 - 6 Attribute Comparison of RR and RS 
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Finally, there is a weighting system that does not rely on the inputs of a SME, but 
provides a calculation based on a proportion of data.  This method of weighting was 
introduced in Hamill’s layered view of Social Networks.  The weighting measure for a 
specific layer is determined by the proportion of data contained in a specific layer to the 
total amount of data. The potential problems with this method arise from the accessibility 
to information; some groups, affiliations, and so forth are easier to develop information.  
The proportional weight is given in Equation (2.19) (Hamill, 2006: 215): 
 
l
l
L
E
w
E
=  (2.19)  
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This section incorporated a variety of Operations Research techniques as well as 
social sciences and mathematics.  Topics focused specifically on organized crime and 
terrorist groups, the uses of SNA measures and advancements, risk analysis techniques 
and weighted preference functions. The material covered underpins the methods and 
theories used throughout the remainder of this research.
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this research is to determine how critical an individual is to a network 
and its operations.  Ultimately, the goal of this criticality measure is to identify the 
individual or individuals, who if influenced or removed from the network of interest, 
would be most likely to adversely impact or temporarily halt undesired operations.   
The contributions of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Social Influence 
Network (SIN) theory (Katz, 1953; Taylor, 1969; Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Freeman, 
1979; Bonacich, 1987; Sade, 1989; Stephenson and Zelen, 1989; Bonacich, et. al., 2004, 
Newman, 2004), along with the advancements of the meta-matrix components (Carley 
and Krackhardt, 1999, Carley et al., 2000) provide a framework and the tools needed to 
determine an individuals importance across the many layers of social and operational 
connections between group members.    
The criticality measure is comprised of three components: 1) the individual’s social 
connections, 2) the skill and/or resource connections needed for successful operations, 
and 3) their location or proximity to important individuals or events over an operational 
period.  The information needed for each of these factors is summarized in Table 9.   
Table 9 - Information Required for Analysis 
▪ Connections between 
group members based 
on each affiliation of 
interest
▪ Reliability/Availability/ 
Accessibility of each skill 
and material needed to 
conduct an operation 
▪ Location of members 
based on time periods of 
interest
▪ Weights for the 
importance of each type 
of affiliation
▪ Skills/Materials each 
member possess or has 
accessible to them
▪ Tasks each member is 
capable of completing
Social Importance Operational Importance Location Importance
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Figure 7 provides a review of the components of the proposed analysis method.  
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Figure 7 - Analysis Process Diagram 
 
The following sections of this chapter explain in detail the approach for calculating the 
criticality of each of the three components.  
An example network, with social, operational, and location information is provided 
only as a means to demonstrate the concepts throughout Chapter 3.  The example is 
notional and has no affiliations to any real-world organization.  
3.2 Social Importance 
 
The multitude of Social Network Centrality and Social Influence measures provide 
a number of options to analysts to analyze the importance of an individual based on his or 
her position in the network.  The fact that most clandestine networks use some 
Operational Security (OPSEC) practices, as demonstrated in the al-Qaeda Training 
Manual, the boundaries of membership are not know with certainty (Post, 2005).  This 
leads to a limitation in the types of centrality measures that are considered appropriate or 
“stable”, especially in the face of imperfect data (Constenbader and Valente, 2003).  
Other important considerations for centrality measures of networks rely on the 
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directedness of relationship, the probable strength of the relationship, the number of 
intermediaries between members and so forth.  
The concepts of formal and informal networks are a mechanism for identifying the 
nature of the relationship between members.  Tichy et al. recognizes this as “transactional 
content” were relationships contain one of the following four types: “1) exchange of 
affect (liking, friendship), 2) exchange of influence, 3) exchange of information and 4) 
exchange of goods or services” (1979: 508).  Since relationships can exist in any or all of 
the capacities above, decomposing the network into the appropriate formal and informal 
networks provides insight into the strength of member connections as the combination of 
multiple affiliations.   
Through the compilation and analysis of open source information available for 
known and suspected terrorists, Sageman identifies sets of network affiliations.  These 
social affiliations include: acquaintance, friendship, kinship (nuclear family and 
relatives), discipleship and worship (2004: 107-120).  Carley et al. suggest co-worker 
and group members as examples of additional affiliations which could be incorporated 
into an analysis (2006: 257).  Figure 8 represents the composite and layered connections 
of a five member cell.  To determine an individual’s importance to the social network, 
various methods are investigated.   
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Figure 8 - Five member cell: Composite & Layered Connections 
3.2.1 Layer Weighting 
 
The amount of influence a person has on another’s life is dependent on the nature 
of the relationship between the two people (Granovetter, 1973: 1361).  For this reason, an 
importance level must be found for the affiliation types in the network.  When possible, 
Subject Matter Experts (SME), familiar with knowledge of a group’s culture, should be 
consulted for inputs.  A caution with SME inputs stems from the importance placed on 
relationships in different cultural regions.  This research investigates multiple methods 
for determining weights of affiliation layers.  
Swing Weights are the theoretically most preferred form of weighting, but are 
highly reliant on SME inputs.  A benefit of swing weights emerge from the relative 
importance place on one attribute over another by the SME (von Winderfeldt and 
Edwards, 1986: 298).  A drawback of swing weights in the context of Social Networks 
arises from the loss of generality due to the difference in cultural values; this requires 
additional SME inputs to account for groups in different cultures.  The swing weight, 
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based on the Simple Multiattribute Rating Technique in Section 2.5.2, calculations are 
summarized in Equation (3.1) and Equation (3.2) (Kirkwood, 1997: 70).  
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A simple ordinal ranking from a SME, while less desirable, provides a basis for the 
importance of relationships.  Layers should be ranked from most important to least 
important.  Of the von Winderfeldt and Edwards measures introduced in Section 2.5.2, 
the rank reciprocal rule is used due to the increased importance placed in the top ranking 
affiliation types.  Equation (3.3) represents the Rank Reciprocal Rule (1986: 284): 
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Hamill introduces a weighting scheme that when applied, would consider the 
proportion of arcs contain on a specific layer to the total number of arcs in the network 
across all layers (2006: 215).  While this method is not dependant on a SME with cultural 
or regional knowledge of the group, it is not without pitfalls; intelligence analysts often 
know or are able to develop more information about some affiliations than others 
between group members.  As a result, layers which are actually less influential may be 
given a higher weight due to the density of the information collected.  The weights wl for 
a specific layer is the proportion of El, the number of arcs contained in layer l and EL, the 
sum of all arcs in the network as given by Equation (3.4) (Hamill, 2006: 215): 
 3-6 
 
l
l
L
E
w
E
=  (3.4) 
 
Applying this method of weighting to the layers in Figure 8, the following weights were 
calculated:  Acquaintance (.09), Friendship (.27), Nuclear Family (.09), Relative (.18), 
Worship (.18) and Discipleship (.18).   
Weights for a network are important to determining which relationships carry more 
influence in enhancing a person’s importance with the network, but there is no consistent 
manner in which these weights are chosen.  If a SME is available and able to give inputs 
for swing weights, this is preferred.  If time, location or access does not allow for swing 
weighting, the “100 balls” technique, with its shortfalls, may be considered.  If the model 
has the potential to be used for groups across differing cultures, the rank reciprocal rule 
may be more robust.  If an analyst is not comfortable with the results of the layer 
proportions, considering all weights equal is yet another option for an analyst.  Finally, a 
mix of techniques may be applied as time and importance of the analysis and modeling 
allows.  The analytic situation will dictate which method is most appropriate, although 
time and resources permitting, swing weighting is preferred.   
3.2.2 Centrality Measures 
 
The appropriateness of centrality measure use is dependent on the structure of the 
network and the information desired.  As detailed in Section 2.3.1, the centrality methods 
covered are used in the SNA community, which Carley contends are appropriate for 
covert networks when taken in combination with the dynamic relationships involving 
tasks and resources (2003: 3).  Due to the secretive nature of the terror organizations and 
the sparseness of the connections, some things are known or may be assumed about the 
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structure of the group.  The individual’s importance may pertain to their position as an 
intermediary between members (betweenness centrality), their role in perpetuating 
information through the network (information centrality), or the prestige of a person base 
on those they are connected to (eigenvector centrality) (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 188-
198 and Bonacich et al, 2004: 192).  All information about the group and the desired 
information about the members is evaluated through the remainder of this section.   
Since betweenness looks at shortest paths were a specific member is on the path 
between two other members, there may be promise in determining this value.  The key 
advantage of identifying this individual would be apparent in their removal from the 
network, as members would then be disconnected and the paths to propagate a message 
would be longer (Borgatti, 2005: 60).   In a study by Borgatti et al. were nodes and arcs 
were added and removed from random graphs, betweenness centrality appeared slightly 
less sensitive to possible imperfect data than degree, closeness and eigenvector 
centralities (2006: 134). 
Similar to betweenness, information centrality identifies members of a network 
who lie on the path between two other members (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 193).  The 
strength of information centrality is attributed to the consideration of all paths connecting 
two members, not just the shortest path (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989: 3).  Hamill’s 
research identifies a problem with inconsistencies in calculation methods offered by 
Stephenson and Zelen, but suggests that calculations done strictly by Stephenson and 
Zelen’s definition removes the potential for error (2006: 304-308).  This error is 
especially troubling in light of the potential for imperfect data in large clandestine groups, 
as the need for all paths between members propagates the potential for error.   
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Eigenvector centrality uniquely considers a member’s importance based on the 
importance of the individuals to whom the member is connected (Bonacich et al., 2004: 
192).   In other words, you are only as important as the people you know.  In a 
comparison of multiple centrality measures, eigenvector centrality was favored in cases 
were “network data is incomplete” (Constenbader and Valente, 2003: 305); given the 
secrecy of clandestine groups and knowledge that data is likely incomplete, eigenvector 
centrality is a suitable choice.  Stephenson and Zelen argue a limitation to this method is 
caused by the inability to consider “multiple paths” between members (1989:4).  
Advancements to Eigenvector Centrality adapt the measure for use with weighted graphs 
(Newman, 2004).     
3.2.3 Combining Layers  
 
An initial method for combining multiple layers of social networks, introduced by 
Clark, combines an individual’s characteristics and centrality measure (2005).  Since this 
research is concerned with the centrality, the personal characteristics will not be included.  
Clark’s calculations included the use of Information Centrality (described in Section 
2.3.1) for each affiliation layer, then used an additive function with equal weighting to 
give a total Centrality Measure. Equation (3.5) represents the weighted centrality used by 
Clark, where wi represents the weight associated with the ith affiliation layer and Ii the 
vector of centrality scores for all members for the ith affiliation layer (2005: 3-25): 
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The second method, introduced by Hamill, calculates the information centrality of 
members based on valued relations (2006: 201).  Adjacency matrices, as used by Clark, 
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fail to account for the relative strength of relationships within the network.  Hamill 
incorporates an additive value of dynamic weights to determine the relationship strength, 
as indicated by Equation (3.6): 
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The result of this method, applied to the layered connections of Figure 8, using the layer 
proportional weighting produces the following weighted graph (Figure 9): 
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Figure 9 - Five Member Cell -Weighted Graph 
 
3.2.4 Section Summary 
 
This section reviews methods for determining an individual’s social importance.  
The understanding that relationships exist based on different types of affiliations, allows 
analysts to investigate the nature of the group members based on those layers.  The 
influence a person has on others depends on the type of affiliation the two members 
share, this leads to the need to prioritize the affiliations via weights.  Weights calculated 
via SME inputs are most desired, but alternative methods may be necessary.  The 
centrality measures provide a means to determine the power or influence a member has 
within the network.  Finally, the two components must be merged; Clark and Hamill 
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provide similar approaches (Clark, 2005; Hamill, 2006).  The Social Importance acts as 
only one element to a member importance, the two remaining elements are introduced in 
the following sections.   
3.3 Operational Importance  
 
In addition to the social importance a member holds within a clandestine network, 
consideration must also be given to the operational value of the members.  Viewing these 
operations from a project management perspective, management of the group’s resources 
is essential to any project’s completion or in the case of terror groups, successful attacks 
(Shtub et al., 2005: 457).  Resources in this context can refer to personnel, expertise or 
materials; each group’s resources will depend on their tactics.  The availability or 
reliability of these resources will impact the project completion or operational success.   
 The criticality of a task can be attributed to precedence of the tasks, the availability 
of personnel to complete, especially those needing a specific expertise, and the 
availability or reliability of the resources used in completion of the task.  The first 
measure used in this section represents the importance of each task.  The following 
section measures the criticality of the skills/expertise and materials to the task’s 
completion.  Finally, the factors are combined to give an operational score for each 
member of the group.    
3.3.1 Task Importance 
 
Task completion is essential to a group’s continued operational success, especially 
in the case of conducting attacks.  Bonacich et al.’s multidimensional centrality applied 
to a member/task incidence matrix, as shown in Table 10 , provides a measure for task 
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centrality based on the number of personnel capable or available to complete the task 
(2004).  Using the incidence matrix as E, the calculation includes the eigenvector 
associated with the largest eigenvalue of ETE (Bonacich et al., 2004: 195).  This, 
however, conflicts with what is needed, since the tasks with fewer people capable or 
available has a greater potential for being incomplete, should the members become 
incapacitated or unavailable.  Hence, the reciprocal of the values from the eigenvector is 
used, to give tasks with fewer members a higher value.  Normalization of the reciprocal 
values provides a proxy measure of importance relative to the other tasks.   
Table 10 - Member/Task Incidence Matrix 
task1 task2 task3
member 1 1 0 1
member 2 0 1 0
member 3 1 0 0
member 4 1 0 1
member 5 0 0 1
 
 
 
An issue that arises with some data, for example that contained in Table 10, results 
from a value of 0 for task2.  Since the reciprocal can not be taken, some small epsilon 
(i.e. 0.01 or 0.001) should be used in the place of the 0.  This epsilon method, however 
places an unrealistic portion of importance on the task. Hence, in some situations, an 
alternative method may be needed.  
An alternative to the eigenvector centrality calculation is the proportional 
weighting suggested by Hamill, as explain in Section 2.5.2 (2006; 215).  This method 
would account for members capable of completing a specific task, as a proportion of the 
sum of members capable across all tasks.  A comparison of the two methods is provided 
in Table 11.   
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Table 11 - Comparison of Eigenvector Centrality & Proportional Task Scores 
eigenvector 
centrality 
modified 
eigenvector 
centrality
normalized, 
reciprocal of 
eigenvector 
centrality
proportional 
weight
normalized, 
reciprocal of 
proportional 
weight
Task1 0.71 0.71 0.01 0.43 0.20
Task2 0.00 0.01 0.97 0.14 0.60
Task3 0.71 0.71 0.01 0.43 0.20
 
 
 
A potential argument concerning this method for determining task importance is 
likely to come from discussion around tasks were few members are capable or available.  
The case could be that the task is simplistic and needs very few members to support.   
However, if this is the case, more members should be available or capable of completing 
the task.  Thus it is assumed that the member/task incidence matrix represents the 
members capable or available to complete the specific task, not the number of people 
needed or assigned to the task.  If this assumption holds, then all other things being equal, 
tasks with few members will more likely be incomplete, due to non-redundancy, should 
the individual(s) be removed from the network or influenced not to complete the task. 
3.3.2 Event Tree/Reliability 
  
 System or operational analysis is a specific application of probabilistic risk 
analysis (PRA) or reliability analysis (Høyland and Rausand, 1994: 9).  By viewing an 
organization’s operations as a system with components, which may or may not be reliable 
at a given time, PRA can be applied.  The components used in evaluating the system 
represent the skills and/or materials used by the members to conduct operations.  From 
the terror organization’s view, an operation or attack is either successful or unsuccessful; 
numbers of casualties are not necessarily an indicator of success, since a target could 
potentially be part of the adversary’s infrastructure.  Thus the outcome, or consequence, 
represents either a success or failure.  This section focuses on the use of Event Trees to 
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determine the risk to the terrorist organization of an operation or attack being 
unsuccessful.  The following section provides methods for calculating probabilities, 
followed by measures of importance or criticality for the skills and/or materials needed to 
ensure operational success. 
In an effort to move away from the use of imprecise estimates of probabilities in 
this risk analysis, numerical probabilities are used in the event tree.  Though much of the 
specific data pertaining to the availability or reliability of resources of a terrorist 
organization is likely classified, statistical methods exist to calculate probabilities.  One 
possibility is found in Haimes (2004).  He suggests triangular distributions as a method 
which requires SME inputs.  Triangular Distributions require three values, the most likely 
value (c), best-case value (b) and worst-case value (a), which are combine to provide a 
probability density function with an expected value, given by Equation (3.7) (2004; 156-
158):  
 [ ]
3
a b cE X + +=  (3.7)  
A method solely based on available data is frequency counts; the frequency of a specific 
outcome is taken a proportion of the total number of outcomes.  For example, if 50 
similar events are observed and outcome A occurred 13 times, then the likelihood of 
outcome A could be estimated as 13/50 or 26%.  Other such approaches exist and should 
be applied to estimating probabilities where sufficient data exists (Haimes, 2004: 138).   
Event Trees are one method used for observing and calculating probabilities 
associated with risk (Bedford and Cooke, 2001: 99).  The risk triple, as covered in 
Section 2.4.1, R = <Si, Li, Xi> where Si represents a risk scenario, Li is the likelihood of 
the scenario and Xi  is the outcome associated with the scenario (Kaplan and Garrick, 
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1981: 13), contains information about the specific risk associated with a component of 
the system/operation, likelihood and consequence of the event (Haimes, 2004: 92-93).  
Event Trees typically represent binary events (i.e. success/failure, available/unavailable, 
etc.), but the characteristics of a component, acting as an event in the tree, can represent 
any possibilities of interest (Papazoglou, 1998: 170).  For example, a system’s flow 
capacity at high, medium and low/none may be of more interest than a simple flow/no 
flow scenario.  Event Trees are simply a modeling tool to aid the analysis of outcomes 
based on the logic and likelihood of “simpler events” (Papazoglou, 1998: 170). 
Based on reports of attacks and the known tactics practiced by some groups, 
Suicide Bombings are an attack mechanism increasingly practiced by terrorist groups 
(Pape, 2003).  This scenario is used here to illustrate the methodology of using event 
trees to evaluate the risks associated with such a simple operation.  For the purpose of 
discussion, it will be assumed, there are three components to a suicide bombing scenario: 
a bomber, an explosive and a target (Pape, 2003: 345).   
The likelihoods used in the section are merely to demonstrate the methodology; the 
likelihoods for these components in an actual operational scenario, would depend largely 
on the group’s goals, tactics, quality of munitions and member composition.  Actual 
likelihoods should be developed based on the historical patterns and knowledge of the 
ongoing operations of the terrorist group.  The bomber selected for an operation carries a 
reliability; assume there is an 85% likelihood the bomber is willing to detonate the 
explosive device when they arrive at the target.  There is also a reliability associated with 
the explosives; assume there is a 90% likelihood the munition will detonate at the target 
and only 10% likelihood it is defective or will pre-detonate, killing only terrorists in 
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preparation of the attack.  Finally, surveillance is needed for a target to determine 
potential security risks and the time of maximal civilian or adversary proximity; assume 
the surveillance conducted for a target is 99% accurate for a given time period and only 
1% inaccurate, making the target inaccessible.  Figure 10 represents the event tree for the 
outlined notional scenario. 
Explosive (M1) Target (K1) Bomber (K2) Likelihood Outcome
85.0% 0.757 X1
99.0%
15.0% 0.134 X2
90.0%
85.0% 0.008 X3
1.0%
15.0% 0.001 X4
10.0% 0.100 X5
effective
defective/pre-detonate
Suicide Bomber Scenario
accessable
inaccessable
Willing
Not Willing
Willing
Not Willing
 
Figure 10- Event Tree Suicide Bombing Scenario 
  
The event tree shows five possible outcomes {X1, X2, X3, X4, X5} with respective 
likelihoods of (0.767, 0.134, 0.008, 0.001, 0.100).  The failure of any component will 
result in a mission failure, with the exception of the surveilled target, as the bomber 
would likely detonate in-place should a barrier or security interfere.  According to 
Papazoglou, the outcome space can be partitioned into two mutually exclusive subsets, 
were Mission Success = {X1, X3} and Mission Failure = {X2, X4, X5} (1998: 173).  Since 
the partitioned outcome spaces have been constructed to be mutually exclusive, a 
probability for each is determined by Equations (3.8) (Papazoglou, 1998: 180): 
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The result then indicates that the estimated probability of a Mission Success is 0.765 and 
the estimated probability of Mission Failure is 0.235.  The intended use of event trees is 
for the reliability analysis of the components, thus risk importance measures are 
incorporated in the next section.   
Since suicide attacks are not the only tactic exploited by terror groups, event trees 
for other types of attacks are included.  Chapter 4 contains an example with an 
Improvised Explosive Device attack.  Appendix A contains important components for 
other attacks including: Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear weapons.    
3.3.3 Risk Importance Measures 
 
The purpose of the Risk Importance Measure is to identify the risk associated with 
each component of the system or operation (van der Boorst and Schoonakker; 2001).  
This methodology aims to provide a relative measure of importance for the components 
which have the greatest potential to cause a mission failure.  The Risk Importance 
Measures, introduced in Section 2.4.3, are intended to exhibit various aspects of a 
system’s potential for risk and the risk contributing components.  These measures 
focused on “risk reduction and risk achievement” (van der Boorst and Schoonakker, 
2001: 241-242). The risk reduction measures quantify the improvement to a system if a 
component were perfect (Vesely et al., 1983: 5).  The risk achievement measures 
determine the risk should a component always fail (Vesely et al., 1983: 3).  A 
combination of the multiple measures provides an analyst with the best perspective of 
what is likely to increase or decrease the reliability of the system when the component 
reliabilities change (Vesely et al., 1983: 1; van der Boorst and Schoonakker, 2001: 242).   
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The Risk Importance Measures considered for this methodology included a mix of 
risk reduction and risk achievement measures, as introduced in Section 2.4.3.  Several of 
the measures are either directly or inversely related, therefore only those which are 
unrelated were considered (Vesely et al., 1983; Høyland and Rausand, 1994, van der 
Boorst and Schoonakker, 2001; Pottonen, 2005).  Due to the consideration for the 
proportion of improvement, this research will used the Fussell-Vesely measure, as it aids 
in the identification of the component most likely to cause system failure (Høyland and 
Rausand, 1994:203); shown in Equation (3.9) (van der Boorst and Schoonakker, 
2001:242).   
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
Fussell-Vesely :   i
P MF P MF x
FV i
P MF
− =
=   (3.9) 
Another commonly used measure is the Risk Achievement Worth measure, which 
quantifies the impact a component has on the current level of system reliability (Pottonen, 
2005: 92); shown in Equations (3.10) (van der Boorst and Schoonakker, 2001:242). 
 ( ) ( )( )
1
Risk Achievement Worth :   i
P MF x
RAW i
P MF
=
=  (3.10) 
For both measures, ( )P MF  is the probability of Mission Failure under the current 
reliability of components, ( )0iP MF x =  is the conditional probability of Mission 
Failure, given component i does not fail and ( )1iP MF x =  is the conditional probability 
that component i always fails.     
To combine these two measures, each should be normalized, via the one-norm, to 
provide a relative importance, before the measures are averaged.  The results for the 
Suicide Attack scenario used in the previous section are provided in Table 12. 
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Table 12 - Fussell-Vesely & RAW Measures Combined 
Resource FV
Normalized 
FV RAW
Normalized 
RAW Average
Explosive (M1) 0.36 0.39 4.26 0.45 0.42
Target (K1) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.05
Bomber (K2) 0.57 0.61 4.26 0.45 0.53
 
 
The results in Table 12 show the Bomber willingness is the most important, while the 
Target availability is least.   This confirms Pape’s assertion that a willing Bomber is more 
likely to create the condition for a successful mission due to their flexibility (2003: 346).    
3.3.4 Assigning Operational Value to Members 
 
Ultimately, the operational importance value must be attributed to the group 
members.  Under the assumption that the resources of a group are independent, an 
additive linear preference model easily combines the values (von Winderfeldt and 
Edwards, 1986: 276).  Using the member/task, member/knowledge and member/materials 
incidence matrices, the overall operational criticality of a member can be assigned as 
presented in Equation(3.11) . 
 [ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( )/ / /M T TaskScores M K KnowledgeScores M Mat MaterialsScores+ +  (3.11) 
[M/i] represents the Incident matrices associate with Task, Knowledge and Materials.  
(Scores) correspond to the vector of measures calculated for the Tasks, Skills/Knowledge 
or Materials importance.  The scores for the members should then be normalized across 
the group to provide a relative value of importance for each member within the 
operational context.   
3.3.5 Section Summary  
 
The operational component to groups can be drastically different based on the 
group’s relational dynamics, their goal and the tactics they implore.  For this reason, a 
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variety of Operation Research techniques are needed to model the various aspects 
contributing to the operational success of a group.  Tasks criticality and materials and 
skill/knowledge importance were those considered in this research.  The eigenvector 
centrality accounts for the capability of members for across multiple tasks 
simultaneously, but creates the potential for error.  The proportion of tasks method 
reduces the potential for error, making it less likely to place too much importance on any 
specific task unless warranted by a small number of available members.  Event trees 
provide a means to calculate the probability a mission will succeed or fail, base on the 
reliability of the components (materials/skills).  The probabilities are then used to 
evaluate the contribution of the components to a mission failure through the Fussell-
Vesely and Risk Achievement Worth measures.  Finally, all of the resource importance 
values are summed and normalized across the group, allowing an analyst to determine the 
member with the greatest operational criticality.  It should be noted that since the 
probabilities for such events incorporate human actions, the precision associated with 
systems engineering reliability analysis is unlikely.  This method, even with a level of 
imprecision, provides analysts a means to gain insight into terrorist attacks and 
operations.      
3.4 Time and Location  
 
To disrupt a network, time and location are two essential pieces of information.  
The movement of members provides insight into the locations for safe houses, meeting 
locations, weapons caches, and other such facilities.  Locations can also provide 
information about event planning.  The presence of personnel at a special training facility 
may indicate the need for improved skills to advance attack tactics.  Timing and location 
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information near potential targets could provide insight into the groups’ intent.  The 
following section develops a method to quantify the potential importance of group 
member presence at locations during specific time periods. 
The first approach for determining members’ temporal and spatial criticality, 
comes from inputs of SME.  A SME familiar with the group and its operations can 
provide invaluable insight into the importance of member location.  These locations 
could be tied to training, meetings, materials movement, targets, or other operational 
factors.  The value for a member whose location is unknown should also be obtained 
from the SME, if possible.  The weighting of location importance can be found via swing 
weight or ranking, as introduced in Section 2.5.2.   
When SMEs are unavailable, an importance value can be attributed to members 
based on their location over a given period or at different locations through several time 
periods.   Bonacich et al.’s multidimensional centrality, discussed in Section 2.3.2, 
provides the mechanism to allow for social connections to be time and/or location 
dependent (2004).  To achieve this, a member/connections (node-arc) incidence matrix is 
needed.  The connections are represented in the rows of the matrix and the members 
make up the columns.  This matrix is then augmented with the locations and/or time 
periods of interest and used to indicate the time or location a specific a connection 
occurred; resulting in ;  E M L=    where  ,  M Member Incidence= and  
 L Location Incidence=  (Bonacich et al., 2004: 201). This augmented matrix accounts 
for who was meeting whom and when and where they met.  The calculation provides a 
measure for the location or temporal importance for connections or presence based on the 
importance of the members present at that location or during that time period.  
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This method does not account for certain occurrences that may also be of interest, 
such as an individual who appears at a location, but is not know to have met with other 
members or when a member’s location is unknown for a specific period.  Since leaving 
these individuals unaccounted for will produce a value of zero for their time and location 
criticality, a modification must be made.  If a dummy node is added to represent a 
connection, the member’s presence at a location can be accounted for.  A dummy 
connection and location (i.e. location unknown) must be added when a member’s location 
is unknown.  The addition of the dummy connections and locations will increase the 
dimensionality of the matrix, especially for large networks. 
Figure 11 represents the five member cell used in Section 3.3.1.  The connections 
of members are considered at two separate locations over the same period of time (i.e. a 
week or month).   
Location 
1: 1
2
3 54
Location 
2:
1
2
3 54
 
Figure 11 - Five Member Multi-dimension Graph 
 
The bold nodes represent members who appeared at the location during a period of time.  
The arcs connecting members represent known meetings or connections at the specified 
location.  Table 13 represents the node-arc incidence matrix, as proposed by Bonacich et 
al. (2004: 191).  
 Table 13 - Member & Location/Connections Incidence Matrix 
Member1 Member2 Member3 Member4 Member5 Location1 Location2
(1-2) 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
(2-5) 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
(2-3) 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
(3-5) 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
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However, notice Member 3 was known to be at Location 1, but is unaccounted for in the 
incidence matrix.  In addition, Member 4 does not appear in either location and would be 
give a value of 0; the fact that a member is unaccounted for may be of great significance.  
Unless a SME is able to provide an approximation for the significance of a member’s 
presence being unknown, a proxy value greater than 0 should be calculated instead.  
Table 14 represents the proposed modified incidence matrix. 
Table 14 - Modified Member & Location/Connection Incidence Matrix 
Member1 Member2 Member3 Member4 Member5 connection place holder Location1 Location2 Loc Unk
(1-2) 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
(2-5) 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
(2-3) 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
(3-5) 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
 
 
 
The results of eigenvector centrality, as applied to the data in Table 13 and Table 
14, are provided in Table 15.  For the data in Table 13, the importance of Location 1 and 
Location 2 is equal.  However, the data in Table 14 shows Location 1 as scoring higher, 
since more members were present at Location 1.  This also imputes a value for the 
member whose location was unknown; while the number is small in this example, this 
will not always be the case.   
Table 15 - Comparison of Location Importance 
eigenvector 
centrality of 
Incidence 
Matrix
normalized 
eigenvector 
centrality of 
Incidence 
Matrix
eigenvector 
centrality of 
Modified 
Incidence 
Matrix
normalized 
eigenvector 
centrality of 
Modified 
Incidence 
Matrix
Location1 0.39 0.50 0.48 0.57
Location2 0.39 0.50 0.33 0.39
Loc Unk  - 
 - 0.03 0.04
 
  
 
An extension to this method would be to allow the connections to carry the 
weights, as calculated by Hamill’s method in Section 3.2.3.  The five member cell 
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weighted graph produced the modified incidence matrix as displayed in Table 16.  The 
normalized eigenvector centrality of the connections and locations, determines the 
location values as follows: Location 1 (.69), Location 2 (.06) and Location Unknown 
(.25).  The location criticality value would then be added for each member across both 
locations and time periods.  The member location values must be normalized via the one 
norm to provide the relative location importance of each member. 
Table 16 - Modified Incidence Matrix Based on Weighted Graph 
Member1 Member2 Member3 Member4 Member5 connection place holder Location1 Location2 Loc Unk
(1-2) 0.27 0.27 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
(2-5) 0 0.09 0 0 0.09 0 1 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
(2-3) 0 0.18 0.18 0 0 0 0 1 0
(3-5) 0 0 0.18 0 0.18 0 0 1 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
 
 
 SME inputs for location are always preferred, as a SME will have the best 
understanding of the importance locations and time will have on the group’s activities.  
Short of being able to get such information, the eigenvector centrality of the relationship 
matrix augmented provides a reasonable alternative.  Since the approach can be applied 
to either adjacency or weighted graphs, the method is flexible enough to incorporate the 
data an analyst provides.  A modification to the methods with the added place holder for 
a member and unknown location allows additional information to be considered and 
calculated.   
3.5 Additive Preference Function  
 
The Social, Operational and Location Criticality must now be combined to give a 
single Network Criticality measure for each group member.  Thus, weights must be 
determined either with SME swing weight inputs, SME ranking or another method 
discussed in Section 2.5.2.  In the event other weighting methods are not desired, the 
 3-24
three components can be weighted equally.  Once the weights are established, similar to 
Equation (3.5), the product of the weight with the corresponding criticality for member i 
are combined, as seen in Equation (3.12). 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,i social i social operational i operational location i locationC w C w C w C= + +  (3.12) 
 
This provides a weighted measure, combining social, operational and temporal local 
factors to the importance of an operator to a particular operation.  These measures can be 
used to help guide the allocation of scare resources, provide screening for the analyst, and 
serve as inputs to other approaches.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The importance or criticality of a group member is based on the additive value of 
one’s social, operational and location criticality.  Weights are used throughout this 
methodology and SME inputs are preferred, however alternative methods may be used if 
a SME is unavailable. 
The social importance of an individual hinges on the ordering of calculations.  
Weights for the types of affiliations are needed regardless of the method used to combine 
the layers.  The swing weights or ranking are the most preferred methods, since the 
proportional weights provide an opportunity to apply too much importance to an 
affiliation simply because the information is easier to collect.  Hamill’s application of the 
centrality measures to a weighted graph make the most sense, as relationships across 
various types of affiliation types carry different levels of importance to an individual.  
While information centrality provides a look at possible links between members, 
eigenvector centrality has been show to be stable under the assumption of imperfect data. 
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Ultimately the choice of centrality measure will depend on the type of information 
wanted or needed by the analyst.   
The operational importance of the member must consider their role in the 
completion of tasks, their skills or expertise and their connection to materials.  The 
normalized reciprocal of the eigenvector centrality applied to the member/task incidence 
matrix provide a quantitative means to determine task criticality.  The measure is then 
attributed to the members with the ability to complete the task.  The use of risk applied to 
terrorist organization operations allows the exploitation of probabilities, events trees and 
risk importance measures to determine the critical nature of the group’s resources.  
Partitioning the outcome space into events which indicate the success or failure of an 
attack allows the application of reliability measures.  The averaged combination of 
normalized Fussell-Vesely and Risk Achievement Worth measures offers an importance 
of mission essential resources, which in turn are attributed to the individuals possessing 
the connections to those items.   
The location of a member or members during a given time can provide information 
about the group’s operations and event/attack planning.  A SME’s interpretation of the 
location information would provide the best means to measure the location importance.  
When a SME is unavailable to provide such information, the normalized sum of 
multidimensional eigenvector centrality applied to a relation and location incidence 
matrix quantifies location importance.  The flexibility of the method allows for weighted 
or unweighted relations among members.   
The social, operational and location criticality are combined for each member by 
an additive function.  This value can then be used to identify opportunities to effectively 
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disrupt the network.  The removal or influence of an individual with a high criticality 
value, will potentially impact the group’s social structure and operational effectiveness 
and thus provide a means to accomplish the goals established for combating terrorism.  
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4 Results and Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter demonstrations the methodology presented in Chapter 3 via a case 
based study based on open source information concerning the US embassy bombings in 
East Africa occurring on August 7, 1998.  The attacks were carried out by two 
cooperating al-Qaeda cells against the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania (Champagne, 2005).  This analysis determines the member importance 
via the social connections, task contributions, materials and skills accessed and the 
presence at locations of importance.  The meta-matrices displaying all member, skill, 
materials and task connections are provided in Appendix B.   
The results of this analysis identify the individuals within the group, who, if 
influenced or removed, would have hampered the operational success of this event.  
These results are then compared to those suggested by Carley: degree and betweenness 
centralities, cognitive load and task exclusivity (2003: 5).  Calculations of these four 
measures are via the Operational Risk Analysis software created by Carley and the 
Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) 
(2006). 
4.2 Event Background 
 
The background information provided in this section was adapted from a student 
working paper, based on a course taught by William Keller (Champagne, 2005).  al-
Qaeda operations in Africa are believed to have increased substantially with support to 
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extremists, in Somalia, to disrupt US and United Nations support to Somalian refugees 
(2005; 53).  As early as 1993, possible attack targets were serveilled (2005; 54).  
Members who planned and conducted the attacks included: 
• Planners and Facilitators from al-Qaeda Leadership: Osama Bin Laden, 
Mamdouh Salim, Ali Mohamed, Kherchtou, Khalid al-Fawwaz (Financier), 
Abouhlaima, Wahid el-Hage, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Muhsin Musa 
Matwalli Atwah (Electrical Engineer) 
 
• Nairobi, Kenya Cell: Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-
Owhali (Suicide Bomber), Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Azzam (Suicide 
Bomber) 
 
• Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Cell: Fahad Mohammed Ally Msalam, Mustafa 
Mohammed Fadhil, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, 
Hamden Khalif Allah Awad (Suicide Bomber) 
  
 
In 1994, el-Hage assumed control of the East Africa cell, but was replaced by 
Abdullah in 1997 when the US Federal Bureau of Investigation became suspicious of his 
activities (2005; 55).  In June and July 1998, the two cells procured a house and vehicle 
for use in each attack (2005; 57-58).  In late July 1998, members from both cells began 
grinding the explosive (TNT), which was mixed with aluminum powder and used in 
combination with oxygen tanks to increase the explosive effect (2005; 69).  Atwah, who 
was an electrical engineer, assembled the bombs and wired the trucks to be used as 
vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) (2005; 16).  Most members of the 
cells were ordered to vacate the target areas prior to the attack date (2005; 57).  Suicide 
bombers Azzam, al-Owhali and Awad proceeded to the targets on August 7, 1998.  Both 
trucks encountered obstacles at the target sites, but detonated near the target sites (2005; 
59-62).  The attacks killed a total of 224 people, 213 in Nairobi, Kenya and 11 in Der es 
Salaam, Tanzania, not including the suicide bombers (2005; 68).  
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4.3 Social Importance 
 
The analysis in this section aims to identify the critical members of the social 
network for the East African Embassy bombing cell.  For this type of analysis, an in 
depth study is needed to uncover the nature of the relationships between members.  The 
first obstacle encountered related to conflicting information found in various open source 
resources.  Therefore the information used in this analysis is a compilation of data from 
multiple sources.  The second difficulty came from the lack of information related to the 
nature of connections between members.  While the members of this group are likely 
connected to the larger al-Qaeda network through the six affiliations described by 
Sageman, there is limited evidence that the sub-network of cell members are connected 
via these same affiliations; therefore only a subset of the original six layers will be 
modeled with additional layers to represent member connections in this illustration.   
The subject matter experts (SME) consulted for this case study have years of 
experience in the intelligence field.  Based on the recommendation of the SME, the 
affiliations used to connect the East Africa bombing cell included: Reverent Power, 
Training, Friend and Group Member.  Reverent Power is designated for relationships 
which are based on a supervisor/subordinate or some legitimate power or influence based 
on the member’s position in larger organization and within the cell.   Training is a 
connection representing a trainer/trainee relationship to include religious, jihad, weapons 
and so forth.  The Friend connection indicates a relationship beyond the attack 
coordination, referring to house mates, business partners, previous co-workers and other 
encounters before this event.  Finally the Group Member links those who worked 
together for this attack, both within their sub-cell and across cells.   Figure 12 represents 
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the social connections among group members; affiliation types are denoted in Appendix 
B.   
 
Figure 12 - Graphic of East Africa Embassy Attack Network 
 
The SMEs found identifying the relative importance between affiliations difficult, 
however they were able to supply ranks for the affiliations within the sub-group; rank 
based weights for social networks, using Sageman’s open source affiliations, are 
presented in Appendix C.  The SMEs indicated there would be little difference between 
the Reverent Power and Training connections, therefore both carry equal weight.   The 
sub-group affiliations, rank and weights are depicted in Table 17.   
Table 17 - Sub-Group Affiliation Ranks & Weights 
Affiliation Rank Weight
Reverent Power 1 0.36
Training 1 0.36
Friend 3 0.16
Group Member 4 0.12
 
 
The weights were calculated via the Rank Reciprocal rule as shown in Equation (3.3) 
with one variation.  The items ranked third and fourth were calculated with the standard 
first to fourth ranking.  The sum of the weights for items ranked third and fourth was 
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subtracted from one and the remainder was split equally between Reverent Power and 
Training, since they were considered equally important.   
 The resulting weighted connections matrix, based on the combination of layers as 
described by Hamill, is presented in Appendix B.  The normalized and non-normalized 
eigenvector centrality scores for each member, developed from the weighted connections 
are shown in Table 18.    
Table 18 - Member Criticality: Normalized Eigenvector Centrality 
Member
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
Normalized 
Eigenvector 
Centrality
Mohamed Sadeek Odeh 0.430 0.114
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed 0.391 0.104
Wadih el-Hage 0.334 0.089
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah 0.326 0.086
Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali 0.309 0.082
Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil 0.237 0.063
Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah 0.221 0.059
Azzam 0.209 0.056
Osama Bin Laden 0.209 0.055
Ali Mohammed 0.183 0.048
Kherchtou 0.177 0.047
Fahad Mohammed Ally Msalam 0.167 0.044
Khalid al-Fawwaz 0.153 0.041
Mamdouh Salim 0.129 0.034
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed 0.103 0.027
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani 0.080 0.021
Hamden Khalif Allah Awad 0.068 0.018
Abouhalima 0.044 0.012
 
Based on the number and nature of the weighted relationships, the results of Table 18 are 
consistent with what would be expected assuming undirected connections between 
members.  Odeh and Fazul were clearly well connected to those in both attack cells and 
to those in the larger organization.  El-Hage and Abdullah were also well connected; this 
is consistent with open source information, as el-Hage was the leader of al-Qaeda in 
Africa and was replaced by Abdullah, who is said to be the “mastermind” of the 
coordinated attack (Champagne, 2005: 57).  Finally, Azzam and Awad, the suicide 
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bombers, were not well connected to the rest of the members, as they had limited roles in 
the preparations of the attacks.  Others in leadership positions appear to have less 
influence or prestige; however this may be attributed to the OPSEC practices of the 
group. 
4.4 Operational Importance  
 
The operational criticality is comprised of two parts: the task criticality and 
materials and skill criticality.  To calculate the task criticality, the member/task incidence 
matrix or assignment network from the meta-matrix is needed (as seen in Appendix B).  
The resource criticality requires a reliability/accessibility measure for each component of 
an operation.  
4.4.1 Task Criticality 
 
In approximately August 1997, the East Africa cell received funds and was ordered 
to begin preparations for an attack (Champagne, 2005: 57).  The tasks identified in this 
attack included: surveillance, weapons training, driving, bomb preparation and bomb 
detonation.  Again, the incidence matrix indicates the individuals capable of completing 
the task; it should be noted that while some members had weapons training, they were not 
considered for the bomb preparation due to their location.   
Through the application of the multidimensional centrality, as presented in Section 
3.3.1, the task criticality values were determined, as seen in Table 19.   
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Table 19 - Task Criticality: Normalized Eigenvector Centrality 
Task 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
Normalized 
Reciprocal of 
Eigenvector 
surveillance 0.17 0.35
driving 0.22 0.28
bomb detonation 0.38 0.16
bomb preparation 0.49 0.12
weapons training 0.74 0.08
 
The results seemed contradictory to the initial argument that the fewer number of people 
capable of a task increases the task’s criticality, since fewer members had driving 
training.  However, after reviewing the individuals with surveillance training, two of the 
leaders/organizers conducted the surveillance and did not participate in other tasks.  
Hence, the removal of these two individuals would have likely interrupted, delayed, or 
lower the likelihood of the success of this operation.   
4.4.2 Skills and Materials Criticality 
 
The materials and skills are combined in an event tree to determine the individual 
contributions to the likelihood of the attack’s success.  The reliability of the explosive 
(bomb) and the bomber are conditional on the weapons expertise and availability of the 
target respectively.  All other reliabilities are represented without the condition of other 
factors.   
In the event analyzed here, the funds, facility and truck were materials which either 
were available and adequate for use or not.   The money was used for the procurement of 
a facility, vehicle and explosives materials; the likelihood of being unavailable is very 
low due to various alternate sources of funds.  The main facility concern was the ability 
to work undetected.  There was a problem with the facility in Tanzania; however the 
effects to the attack were minimal (Champagne, 2005: 58); the time line for the attack 
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may have been impacted, but the remainder of the plan was unaffected.  The truck needed 
only to operate and conceal the explosive.  
The remainder of the components included: weapons expertise, bomb, target 
surveillance and bomber.  Based on the explosive materials used (ground TNT), the 
likelihood of the bomb detonating properly was dependent on the expertise of the bomb 
maker.  This difference is reflected in the event tree.  Likewise, the bomber was more 
likely to detonate the bomb given that the target was accessible; this was evident in the 
Nairobi attack, as al-Owhali, one of the suicide bombers, exited the truck and ultimately 
was not killed in the attack (Champagne, 2005: 61).  Though in both cases the target was 
inaccessible due to obstacles, the attacks were successful in taking lives and spreading 
fear.   
The event tree, including all components, likelihoods and outcomes is displayed in 
Figure 13.  The basic event probabilities for this case study are notational, though are 
based loosely on intelligence analysis of similar previous events and al-Qaeda operations.  
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Figure 13 - Event Tree for East Africa Embassy Bombings 
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The outcomes (Xi) shaded gray denote a failure. The outcome space is reduced to the 
following, where S represents a success and F represents a failure: 
{ }
{ }
1 3 6 8
2 4 5 7 9 10 11 12 13
, , ,
, , , , , , , ,
S X X X X
F X X X X X X X X X
=
=
 
 
The estimated likelihood of a successful attack was 54% and likelihood of failure was 
46%.     
The risk importance of each of the material and skill components needed for the 
attack are calculated via the Fussell-Vesely and Risk Achievement Worth measures as 
described in Section 3.3.3.  The criticality is taken as the average of the two measures, as 
seen in Table 20 .     
Table 20 - Material and Skill Criticality: 
Resource
Fussell-
Vesely RAW
Normalized 
Fussell -
Vesely
Normalized 
RAW Average
Bomber Willingness 0.30 2.17 0.33 0.16 0.25
Facility 0.20 2.17 0.21 0.16 0.19
Bomb 0.20 2.17 0.21 0.16 0.19
Truck 0.07 2.17 0.07 0.16 0.12
Money 0.02 2.17 0.02 0.16 0.09
Surveillance 0.09 1.13 0.10 0.09 0.09
Weapons Expertise 0.04 1.22 0.05 0.09 0.07
 
 
Finally, the task, material and skill importance scores are combined with the 
information in the member/task, member/material and member/skill incidence matrices as 
seen in Equation (3.11).  The resulting operational criticality score for each member is 
depicted in Table 21.   
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Table 21 - Operational Criticality 
Member
Normalized 
Reciprocal 
Task 
Eigenvector 
Centrality
Risk 
Importance 
Measure 
Scores
Normalized 
Operational 
Criticality
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed 0.650 0.788 0.132
Azzam 0.875 0.409 0.118
Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali 0.594 0.409 0.092
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed 0.369 0.599 0.089
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah 0.350 0.587 0.086
Mohamed Sadeek Odeh 0.207 0.599 0.074
Ali Mohammed 0.350 0.339 0.063
Hamden Khalif Allah Awad 0.442 0.249 0.063
Wadih el-Hage 0.083 0.508 0.054
Mamdouh Salim 0.083 0.413 0.045
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani 0.125 0.307 0.040
Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil 0.083 0.319 0.037
Fahad Mohammed Ally Msalam 0.207 0.189 0.036
Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah 0.207 0.189 0.036
Kherchtou 0.207 0.000 0.019
Osama Bin Laden 0.000 0.094 0.009
Khalid al-Fawwaz 0.000 0.094 0.009
Abouhalima 0.000 0.000 0.000
 
 
The results in Table 21, when compared with those in Table 18, show the criticality 
of Fazul and Khalfan Mohamed, for this operation, increased due to their role in 
preparation of the attack.  In addition, near the top are two of the three suicide bombers, 
signifying their criticality to the operations.  The surprising result was the score for 
Atwah; he was solely responsible for assembling the explosives to the detonating devices, 
as he was the only reported electric engineer among the group.  This suggests an 
additional task and skill should be added to account for the importance of connecting the 
bomb for detonation and the electrical skills.  This change provides the new weights for 
the task, materials and skills, as displayed in Table 22.    
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Table 22 - Updated Task and Materials/Skills Scores 
Task Importance Materials/Skills Importance
Bomb Assembly 0.46 Electrical Engineer 0.22
Surveillance 0.19 Bomber 0.19
Drive 0.15 Facility 0.14
Bomb Detonation 0.09 Bomb 0.14
Bomb Preparation 0.07 Truck 0.09
Weapons Training 0.04 Money 0.08
Weapons Expertise 0.07
Surveillance 0.07
Task Criticality Materials/Skills Criticality
 
 
Based on the results of the weights in Table 22, Table 23 represents the updated 
member criticality based on their operational contributions.  With the addition of bomb 
assembly as a task and electrical engineering as a skill, Atwah is one of the most 
important members of this operation.  This change demonstrates the importance of 
identifying all critical tasks, materials and skills in an operation, as well as the flexibility 
to investigate and possibly update results that conflict with SME opinion and other 
intelligence analysis.   
Table 23 - Updated Operational Criticality 
Member
Normalized 
Reciprocal 
Task 
Eigenvector 
Centrality
Risk 
Importance 
Measure 
Scores
Normalized 
Operational 
Criticality 
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed 0.350 0.610 0.119
Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah 0.570 0.360 0.116
Azzam 0.470 0.330 0.100
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed 0.200 0.470 0.083
Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali 0.320 0.330 0.081
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah 0.190 0.440 0.078
Mohamed Sadeek Odeh 0.110 0.470 0.072
Ali Mohammed 0.190 0.260 0.056
Wadih el-Hage 0.040 0.400 0.055
Hamden Khalif Allah Awad 0.240 0.190 0.053
Mamdouh Salim 0.040 0.340 0.047
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani 0.070 0.230 0.037
Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil 0.040 0.260 0.037
Fahad Mohammed Ally Msalam 0.110 0.140 0.031
Kherchtou 0.110 0.000 0.014
Osama Bin Laden 0.000 0.080 0.010
Khalid al-Fawwaz 0.000 0.080 0.010
Abouhalima 0.000 0.000 0.000
 
 4-13
Further, the removal of the bomb maker would also affect other future operations.  
Finally, this update suggests the importance of identifying the key factors and a review 
by knowledgeable experts; factors may be removed later if found to be insignificant, but 
the omission of potentially critical factors could provide misleading results. 
4.5 Time and Location  
 
Finally, the locations of these members were noted at various times and places.  
The location of the group’s members provides insight into the nature of their connections, 
locations of meetings, bases for operations and potential targets.  For the purpose of this 
analysis, the following were used to identify the location criticality of members: 
• Khartoum, Sudan – 1993 
• Somalia – 1993 
• Kenya – 1997 
• Pakistan - June 1998 
• Kenya – Spring –Summer 1998 
• Kenya – Late July/Early August 1998 
• Tanzania – Late July/Early August 1998 
• Karachi, Pakistan – August 7, 1998 
• Kenya – August 7, 1998 
• Tanzania – August 7, 1998 
The table containing the location of members is included in Appendix B.   
The member/connection weighted matrix was created to reflect the meetings 
between members at the locations and times listed above using the method described in 
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Section 3.4.     Applying the multidimensional centrality, as in Section 2.3.2, the 
importance of each location is noted in Table 24.   
Table 24 - Location Importance 
Location/Time
Normalized 
Eigenvector 
Centrality
Sudan - 1993 0.004
Somalia - 1993 0.072
Kenya - 1997 0.104
Pakistan - June 1998 0.010
Kenya - Spring/Summer 1998 0.030
Tanzania - Spring/Summer 1998 0.085
Kenya - July/Aug 1998 0.199
Tanzania - July/Aug 1998 0.339
Pakistan - Aug 7, 1998 0.092
Kenya - Aug 7, 1998 0.025
Tanzaniz - Aug 7, 1998 0.001
Location Unknown 0.037
 
The importance values gained from these results indicates that Tanzania and Kenya in 
late July and early August were most important; the higher value for Tanzania supports 
the information that this attack was planned on a shorter timeline than the Kenya attack, 
as attack preparations were conducted closer to the attack date (Champagne, 2005; 55).  
The importance attributed to each member based on their location at specific times and 
the normalized location criticalities are displayed in Table 25.  
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Table 25 - Normalized and Non-Normalized Location Criticality 
Member
Location 
Criticality
Normalized 
Location 
Criticality 
Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah 0.722 0.132
Fahad Mohammed Ally Msalam 0.620 0.114
Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil 0.516 0.095
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani 0.516 0.095
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah 0.505 0.093
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed 0.431 0.079
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed 0.425 0.078
Mohamed Sadeek Odeh 0.394 0.072
Hamden Khalif Allah Awad 0.377 0.069
Azzam 0.370 0.068
Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali 0.339 0.062
Wadih el-Hage 0.145 0.027
Khalid al-Fawwaz 0.072 0.013
Osama Bin Laden 0.010 0.002
Mamdouh Salim 0.004 0.001
Ali Mohammed 0.004 0.001
Kherchtou 0.000 0.000
Abouhalima 0.000 0.000
 
 
4.6 Additive Preference Function  
 
To determine the overall criticality of each member, an additive preference 
function is used as described in Equation (2.16).  The preference function combines the 
normalized values from Table 18, Table 23, and Table 25 and the weights provided by 
the SME.  Due to the background of the SMEs and the time available, the “100 Ball” 
method was used to elicit the following weights:  Social (.5), Operational (.3) and 
Location (.2).  Using Equation (3.12), the final resulting criticality for each member is 
summarized in Table 26.  
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Table 26 - Total Member Criticality 
Member
Normalized 
Social 
Eigenvector 
Centrality
Normalized 
Operational 
Criticality 
Normalized 
Location 
Criticality
Total 
Criticality
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed 0.104 0.119 0.078 0.103
Mohamed Sadeek Odeh 0.114 0.072 0.072 0.093
Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah 0.059 0.116 0.132 0.090
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah 0.086 0.078 0.093 0.085
Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali 0.082 0.081 0.062 0.078
Azzam 0.056 0.100 0.068 0.071
Wadih el-Hage 0.089 0.055 0.027 0.066
Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil 0.063 0.037 0.095 0.062
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed 0.032 0.083 0.078 0.057
Fahad Mohammed Ally Msalam 0.044 0.031 0.114 0.054
Ali Mohammed 0.048 0.056 0.001 0.041
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani 0.021 0.037 0.095 0.041
Hamden Khalif Allah Awad 0.018 0.053 0.069 0.039
Mamdouh Salim 0.034 0.047 0.001 0.031
Osama Bin Laden 0.055 0.010 0.002 0.031
Kherchtou 0.047 0.014 0.000 0.028
Khalid al-Fawwaz 0.041 0.010 0.013 0.026
Abouhalima 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.006
 
The results in Table 26 show two of the Kenya cell members (Fazul and Odeh) as the 
most critical in this notional example.  Since both of these individuals were included in 
attack preparations very early, their contributions were significant.  Abdullah’s role as the 
leader of the operation warrants the importance level.  Atwah was a significant 
contributor to the operation, as shown by the criticality score.   
4.7 Calculations in ORA 
 
Using the meta-matrices, found in Appendix B, the four measures explained in 
Table 6 were calculated using the Organization Risk Analysis (ORA) software.  One 
important difference between the calculations in this research and ORA is the weighted 
relationships; ORA accounts only for a relationship or the absence of a relationship and 
not the strength of the tie between members.  The results for the Degree centrality, 
Betweenness centrality, Cognitive Load and Task Exclusivity are included in Table 27.  
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Table 27 - ORA Measure Results 
Member 
Deree 
Centrality
Betweenness 
Centrality
Cognitive 
Load/ 
Demand
Task 
Exclusivity
Osama Bin Laden 0.294 0.026 0.079 0.000
Mamdouh Salim 0.176 0.003 0.204 0.000
Ali Mohammed 0.294 0.028 0.128 0.008
Abouhalima 0.118 0.000 0.012 0.000
Kherchtou 0.294 0.019 0.178 0.001
Khalid al-Fawwaz 0.176 0.011 0.068 0.000
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah 0.412 0.089 0.240 0.008
Wadih el-Hage 0.529 0.253 0.189 0.000
Mohamed Sadeek Odeh 0.471 0.061 0.295 0.001
Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali 0.412 0.043 0.259 0.011
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed 0.412 0.048 0.371 0.026
Azzam 0.294 0.010 0.295 0.034
Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah 0.471 0.128 0.256 0.167
Fahad Mohammed Ally Msalam 0.353 0.076 0.184 0.001
Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil 0.412 0.198 0.177 0.000
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed 0.235 0.000 0.305 0.003
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani 0.235 0.000 0.186 0.001
Hamden Khalif Allah Awad 0.294 0.008 0.185 0.026
 
 
 
The two highest score for each measure, in Table 27, are shaded.  The highest 
value is indicated in bold and the second highest is italicized.  These results indicate that 
el-Hage had the highest number of social interactions, with no consideration for the 
strength of the relationships.  El-Hage was removed from his leadership role early during 
preparations, due to attention from the US; his replacement by Abdullah ensured 
continued preparations were successful.  Fazul scored the highest for cognitive demand, 
followed by Khalid.  Due to the various knowledge and materials and the capability to 
complete many of the tasks, Fazul and Khalid were significant contributors.  Finally, 
Atwah was critical due to his electrical engineering skills and Azzam’ contributions, in 
the form of surveillance and the suicide bombing, were also important.     
Portions of the results in this section are inconsistent with the findings of the 
methodology used in this research, though can likely be attributed to differences in the 
weighting of relations and the choice of centrality measures.  el-Hage scored the highest 
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for the unweighted adjacencies used in the calculation of the Degree and Betweenness 
centralities in ORA, as seen in Table 27.  The results of the Eigenvector centrality of the 
weighted relations placed el-Hage third, as seen in Table 18 and seventh for total 
criticality, seen in Table 26.  Ultimately the identification of el-Hage as important, via 
centrality alone, reinforces the premise of this research; the removal of leaders and those 
with social prestige is not enough to destabilize terrorist networks or their operations.  
There is agreement between the two methods that Fazul was an important contributor, 
while Atwah was critical to the completion of the IEDs.      
4.8 Conclusion 
 
The al-Qaeda sub-cell operating in East Africa, conducted attacks on two US 
embassies in 1998.  The social connections between group members provided the means 
to share skills and materials needed to successfully complete the tasks to conduct the 
attacks.  This analysis identifies members critical to the network due to their social 
connections, operational contributions and proximity to meeting and attack locations.  
The result of this open source illustration shows that two of the top three members, with 
high criticality scores, were not leaders; Fazul and Atwah completed critical tasks aided 
by their skills and access to materials.  The idea of destabilizing a network by the 
removal of members other than leaders is supported by Carley’s incorporation of 
cognitive load/demand and task exclusivity (2003: 5).  The identification of members, 
based on operational contributions, was consistent between the methodology use in this 
research and the ORA software. 
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This research is unique due to the efforts to combine Operations Research and 
Social Network theory with the perspectives of SMEs on current terrorist threats and 
events.  The method used here to combine previously unrelated measures, provides a 
collective look at the group members’ position, both socially and operationally, within 
the network.  Ultimately, this research draws on multiple facets of a terrorist organization 
simultaneously, rather than separately.   
The potential benefits from the use of this methodology are not limited to the 
identification of members for influence or removal in order to destabilize the terrorist 
organization.  Members near the top are well connected socially and are important 
operational contributors, implying a level of trust within the organization.  This could 
potentially indicate future leaders within the organization or for specific attacks.  In 
addition, tracking changes in scores may signal potential operational activity even when 
their exact nature is not yet known.  Locations where group members are known to 
frequent could provide the opportunity to gain insight into operations and future plans.  
Further, the location of cells, such as the East Africa cell, could indicate the need for 
increased security at potential target sites.  Finally, the identification of the critical 
materials and skills would focus US and allied efforts to reduce the availability or 
reliability of such resources. 
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5 Conclusions 
 
5.1 Overview of the Model 
 
This thesis provides an approach to determine the criticality of clandestine group 
members to particular operations.  This criticality is comprised of measures which 
account for a member’s social importance, operational contributions and proximity to 
locations important to the organization.  Social Network Analysis (SNA), specifically 
Eigenvector centrality, provides a proxy for the prestige or influence a member has 
within the group based on the members’ relationships.  This research draws on the 
contributions of Clark (2005) and Hamill (2006) to determine the strength of the relations 
between members base on the type of affiliations comprising the connection.  Risk 
Analysis, specifically event trees and risk importance measures, were incorporated to 
analyze how the reliability and availability of resources contribute to the likelihood an 
attack will be successful.  Multidimensional centrality provided the foundation for task 
criticality and location importance to be assigned to group members.  Finally, an additive 
preference model combined the social, operational and location importance with a 
relative weight of each factor to give a total criticality score for each group member. 
5.2 Objectives of this Study  
 
The primary objective of this research was to provide analysts a method to identify 
clandestine group members who if influenced or removed from the network would 
impact the organization’s operations.  Limited open source research has been done to 
provide a comprehensive method for identifying the critical members of clandestine 
networks, hence this research combines multiple disciplines.  Research applying SNA 
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theory to clandestine networks has been primarily due to the efforts of Carley and her 
colleagues.  The Department of Defense and Homeland Security have employed risk 
analysis to identify and mitigate terrorist attack vulnerabilities within the United States, 
but few open source reports have focused on the vulnerabilities in clandestine operations.  
While the method presented in this research crudely combines the multiple facets of 
clandestine operations, it provides a starting point for future research.      
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Since this research uniquely combines the social, operational and location 
importance of clandestine group members, there are a number of avenues available to 
improve calculations and better identify critical members.  Improvements to the 
calculation of relationship strengths are imperative, as the social structure of the group 
provides the basis for operational success.  Additional analysis of the risk associated with 
the organizations’ operations would provide invaluable information.  Finally, the 
incorporation of this method with others to prioritize members for influence or removal 
should be investigated.  
First, this research assumed only positive factors as contributors to the strength of 
the relationship between group members.  Further work with subject matter experts is 
needed to determine the relative importance between affiliations which contribute to the 
strength of relationships.  Realistically, consideration should be given to factors which 
inhibit or degrade the relationships.  These inhibiting factors may include differences 
between tribes, religious views, ethical or moral values, and or a member’s commitment 
(Downs, 2006) to the group and the mission of the organization.  Similarly, the model 
could then account for relations between members which inhibit effective operations. 
 5-3 
Next, more work is needed to improve the risk analysis portion of this method.  To 
begin, data is needed to calculate the reliability and availability of skills and materials 
associated with the group of interest.  Additionally, categorical impacts, in terms of 
potential lives lost, could be tied to the outcomes of the event tree.  This would provide 
the opportunity to calculate the Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) to aid 
efforts to further destabilize operations via the resources.  Sensitivity and uncertainty 
analysis would provide insight into how varied basic event probabilities would change a 
member’s criticality.   
Finally, the criticality of members should be combined with other methods to 
prioritize members for targeting.  Creating a multi-criteria problem with the criticality, 
developed in this research, and a member’s commitment, as developed by Downs (2006), 
would distinguish members who should considered for influence and those who should 
be removed from the network.  Balancing the strength of a relationship with the 
likelihood the relationship truly exists, as formulated by Seder (2007), could aid in 
decreasing the effects of imperfect data.  The weighted relations in this research could be 
combined with Herbranson’s (2007) efforts to create network disruption target sets.  
Ultimately, this method could provide the node criticality and arc weights to optimally 
cut the network into disjoint subsets, destabilizing all social and operational ties. 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The need to destabilize clandestine networks, especially terrorist groups, is not 
likely to decrease in the coming years.  Research must continue to develop methods for 
identifying and targeting the members of these organizations in order to decrease their 
operational success.  Efforts to remove the leaders of terrorist groups have proved 
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ineffective, as other capable members willingly replace them.  The key to stifling the 
operational reach of these terrorist groups lies in the resources.  While many analyses 
currently focus on only the social connections and structures of these groups, it is the 
incorporation of the operational and location information that strengthens this approach.
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Appendix A - CBRN Components 
 
 
The information contained in this appendix, focuses specifically on the components 
needed for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.  These 
components will provide insight into the possible tasks, materials and knowledge 
associated with the use of CBRN weapons in operations.  The information in this section 
is extracted from A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century 
(USTRADOC, 2005).  The guide suggests that as we create counters for the current 
tactics used by terrorists, they will begin to convert to more extreme tactics and weapons.   
A.1 Chemical Weapons 
 
Chemical weapons, as defined by the Department of Defense (DoD Dictionary, 
2001) are: 
“Together or separately, (a) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except 
when intended for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention; (b) a munition or device, specifically designed to cause death 
or other harm through toxic properties of those chemicals specified in (a), 
above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such 
munition or device; (c) any equipment specifically designed for use 
directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices 
specified in (b), above.”  
 
Chemical agents are categorized based on their effect (lethality) and persistence (length 
of effect).  Examples of chemical agents are included in Table 28.  
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Table 28 - Chemical Agents (US Army TRADOC, 2005:G-4,G-5) 
Agent Lethal Symbol Name 
Nerve Yes G Series, GB/Sarin, GD/Soman (VR 55)
Yes V Agent 
Blood Yes AC/Hydrogen Cyanide
Blister Yes
HD/Mustard, HN/ Nitrogen 
Mustard, L/Lewisite, 
HL/Mustard & Lewisite, 
CX/Phosgene Oxime
Choking Yes CG/Phosgene, DP/Diphosagene
Incapacitant No BZ
Irritant No
DA/Diphenyl Chloroarsine, 
DM/Adamsite, CN/Chloro-
acetophenone, CS/O- 
Chloro-benzylidene-
malononitrile, 
PS/Chloropicrin
 
To determine the risk associated with chemical weapons, consideration must be given to 
the dissemination methods, quantity available/accessible either by purchase or theft, and 
the possible use of an explosive weapon in conjunction with the chemicals.  
Dissemination adds a level of complexity to the release of such an agent, since the 
dispersion can be impacted by wind and temperature changes.  A release into the 
environment affects the integrity of the agent and requires a larger quantity of the agent 
to create the desired effect.  Possible delivery methods include: mortars, bombs carried in 
vehicles or backpacks, and long term burst capabilities in the form of vapor or aerosol 
from sprayers or canisters.  Finally, toxic industrial chemicals used in large quantities 
could produce similar results and are more readily available.  
A.2 Biological Weapons 
 
The DoD definition of biological weapons is “An item of materiel which projects, 
disperses, or disseminates a biological agent including arthropod vectors” (DoD 
Dictionary, 2001).  Biological weapons include: pathogenic microbes, toxins and 
bioregulators (Table 29).   
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Table 29 - Biological Agents (US Army TRADOC, 2005: G-9) 
Pathogens Toxins Bioregulators
Anthrax Mycotoxins Neurotransmitters
Cholera Venoms Hormones
Plague Shell Fish Enzymes
Smallpox Botulinum
Tularemia Ricin
Influenza
Fevers
 
Smaller amounts of biological agents are required to achieve the same effect as much 
larger quantities of chemical agents.  Biological agents cost less and are more readily 
available.  Toxins require an individual familiar with genetic engineering in order to 
produce or reproduce.  Dissemination of biological agents is best achieved in liquid or 
powder forms.  Other dissemination methods include:  sprayers or aerosol transported via 
cars, trucks or ships; through heating, ventilation or air conditioning; and water or food 
sources.  
A.3 Radiological Weapons 
 
The DoD definition of radiological operation is defined as:  
“The employment of radioactive materials or radiation producing devices 
to cause casualties or restrict the use of terrain. It includes the intentional 
employment of fallout from nuclear weapons (DoD Dictionary, 2001). 
 
The use of radiological contaminants requires access to materials in either a stable or 
unstable state.  The use of radiological materials in industry, agriculture, and public 
arenas increases the potential for access.  A common dispersion method uses a 
radiological dispersal device (RDD).  The DoD defines a radiological dispersal device as: 
“A device, other than a nuclear explosive device, designed to disseminate radioactive 
material in order to cause destruction, damage, or injury” (DoD Dictionary, 2001).  
Radiological materials combined with conventional explosive weapons would result in a 
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dirty bomb, as a means of dispersion.  Models currently considering the risk associated 
with radiological weapons account for: quantity of the material, specific radiological 
material and the size of its particles, the dispersal technique, wind speed and weather 
conditions, and urban building composition and population densities.  Attacks on the 
physical location of reactors are yet another option of the dispersion of radiological 
materials. 
A.4 Nuclear Weapons 
 
The DoD defines nuclear weapon as:  
 
“A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear 
type), in its intended ultimate configuration which, upon completion of the 
prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing the 
intended nuclear reaction and release of energy” (DoD Dictionary, 2001). 
 
Limitations on money and technical resources create the greatest potential for the 
use of nuclear weapons to fail.  The technical skills needed for a weapon of this 
type includes individuals familiar with nuclear physics, among other skills.  In 
order to use a material, such as plutonium, it must be stolen or purchased.  The 
type of nuclear material dictates the quantity need for an effective attack. 
Specialized skills are required to assemble a device if it is produced.  Specific 
materials and parts are required.  However, if a complete weapon were acquired, 
some of these requirements would not be necessary.  Transportation generally 
needs the means to conceal the bulky bomb and material.  Transportation methods 
include: trucks, vehicles or ships used for shipping. 
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Appendix B - Illustration Data Tables 
 
The information contained in this appendix is used throughout Chapter 4 for the 
notional example.  The information pertaining to members, skills, materials, tasks are 
arranged according to the meta-matrix described in Section 2.3.3.  This appendix also 
includes the following: weighted communications network matrix (used in Section 4.3) 
and the time and location information (used in Section 4.6).  The data contained in this 
section is the fused product of a data set available on the Computational Analysis of 
Social and Organizational System (CASOS) website, event and member information 
available via wikipedia, and Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack (Champagne, 2005). 
 
B.1 Communications Network (Member/Member) 
 
This section contains a table representing the types of affiliations which comprise 
the relationships between members.  Table 30 shows the connections between members 
based on the various types of affiliations (r = reverent power, t = training, f = friend, g = 
group member).   
Table 30 - Communication Network 
OBL Salim Ali Mohammed Abouhalima Kherchtou Fawwaz AAA el-Hage Odeh al-Owhali Fazul Azzam Atwah Fahad Fadhil KKM AKGhailani Awad
OBL r,f r r,g r,g t
Salim r,f r r
Ali Mohammed r t t f r,t
Abouhalima t f
Kherchtou t r r,g t t
Fawwaz r r
AAA r,g r r,g r,g r,g r,g r,g
el-Hage r,g r f f r r r,f,g r,g r,g
Odeh t r,g r,f,g r,g r,f,g r,g g,t r,g
al-Owhali t r,g r,g r,f,g f,g g
Fazul r,t r,g r,g r,f,g r,f,g r,g g
Azzam r,g f,g r,g g
Atwah t r,g g,t g g g g g g
Fahad r,g g r,f,g r,f,g r,g g
Fadhil r,g r,g g r,f,g r,f,g r,g r,g
KKM r,f,g r,f,g g g
AKGhailani r,g r,g g g
Awad g g r,g g g
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The strength of the relationships between members is based on weights for reverent 
power (.36), trainer (.36), friend (.16), and group member (.12).  The weighted 
connections between members are represented in Table 31.  
Table 31 - Weighted Communications Network 
OBL Salim Ali Mohammed Abouhalima Kherchtou Fawwaz AAA el-Hage Odeh al-Owhali Fazul Azzam Atwah Fahad Fadhil KKM AKGhailani Awad
OBL 0 0.52 0.36 0 0 0 0.48 0.48 0 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Salim 0.52 0 0 0 0 0 0.36 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ali Mohammed 0.36 0 0 0.36 0.36 0 0 0.16 0 0 0.72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Abouhalima 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 0 0.16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kherchtou 0 0 0.36 0 0 0.36 0 0.36 0.36 0 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 0 0
Fawwaz 0 0 0 0 0.36 0 0 0.48 0 0.36 0 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 0
AAA 0.48 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.48 0.48 0.48 0 0.48 0.48 0 0 0 0
el-Hage 0.48 0.36 0.16 0.16 0.36 0.48 0 0 0.64 0 0.48 0 0 0 0.48 0 0 0
Odeh 0 0 0 0 0.36 0 0.48 0.64 0 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.48 0 0.48 0 0 0
al-Owhali 0.36 0 0 0 0 0.36 0.48 0 0.48 0 0.64 0.28 0.12 0 0 0 0 0
Fazul 0 0 0.72 0 0 0 0.48 0.48 0.64 0.64 0 0.48 0.12 0 0 0 0 0
Azzam 0 0 0 0 0 0.36 0 0 0.48 0.28 0.48 0 0.12 0 0 0 0 0
Atwah 0 0 0 0 0.36 0 0.48 0 0.48 0.12 0.12 0.12 0 0.12 0.12 0 0 0.12
Fahad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.48 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 0 0.64 0.64 0.48 0.12
Fadhil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.48 0.48 0 0 0 0.12 0.64 0 0.64 0.48 0.48
KKM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.64 0.64 0 0.12 0.12
AKGhailani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.48 0.48 0.12 0 0.12
Awad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 0.12 0.48 0.12 0.12 0
 
B.2 Knowledge Network (Member/Knowledge) 
 
The member/knowledge incidence matrix includes members representing the rows 
and columns representing a knowledge or skill.  A one indicates the member had the 
knowledge or skill, while a zero indicates they did not.  Table 32 shows the skills each 
member was reported to possess, represented by a one under the appropriate task column.   
 
Table 32 - Knowledge Network 
Member Weapons Expertise Surveillance Bomber Mindset Electrical Engineer
OBL 0 0 0 0
Salim 1 0 1 0
Ali Mohammed 0 1 1 0
Abouhalima 0 0 0 0
Kherchtou 0 0 0 0
Fawwaz 0 0 0 0
AAA 0 1 0 0
el-Hage 1 0 1 0
Odeh 1 1 1 0
al-Owhali 1 1 1 0
Fazul 1 1 1 0
Azzam 1 1 1 0
Atwah 0 0 0 1
Fahad 0 0 0 0
Fadhil 1 0 1 0
KKM 1 1 1 0
AKGhailani 0 0 0 0
Awad 0 0 1 0
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B.3 Capabilities Network  
 
The member/materials incidence matrix, in this section, indicates the materials 
accessible to each member.  The resources or materials accessible to each member are 
displayed in Table 33 with a one in the indicated in the appropriate column.  
 
Table 33 - Capabilities Network 
Member Money Facility Truck Bomb/Explosives
OBL 1 0 0 0
Salim 1 0 0 0
Ali Mohammed 0 0 0 0
Abouhalima 0 0 0 0
Kherchtou 0 0 0 0
Fawwaz 1 0 0 0
AAA 0 1 1 1
el-Hage 0 0 0 1
Odeh 0 1 0 0
al-Owhali 0 0 0 0
Fazul 0 1 0 1
Azzam 0 0 0 0
Atwah 0 0 0 1
Fahad 0 1 0 0
Fadhil 0 0 0 0
KKM 0 1 0 0
AKGhailani 0 1 1 0
Awad 0 0 0 0
 
 
 
B.4 Assignment Network  
 
The member/task incidence matrix accounts for the tasks a member is capable of 
completing and not necessarily those a member is assigned to complete.  The assignment 
network represented in Table 34, includes a one for the tasks each member is capable of 
completing. 
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Table 34 - Assignment Network 
Member Surveillance Weapons Training Drive Bomb Preparation Bomb Connection Bomb Detonation
OBL 0 0 0 0 0 0
Salim 0 1 0 0 0 0
Ali Mohammed 1 0 0 0 0 0
Abouhalima 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kherchtou 0 1 0 1 0 0
Fawwaz 0 0 0 0 0 0
AAA 1 0 0 0 0 0
el-Hage 0 1 0 0 0 0
Odeh 0 1 0 1 0 0
al-Owhali 1 1 0 0 0 1
Fazul 0 1 1 1 0 1
Azzam 1 1 1 0 0 1
Atwah 0 1 0 1 1 0
Fahad 0 1 0 1 0 0
Fadhil 0 1 0 0 0 0
KKM 0 1 0 1 0 1
AKGhailani 0 0 0 1 0 0
Awad 0 0 1 0 0 1
 
 
B.5 Knowledge Requirements Network 
 
The knowledge/task incidence matrix represents the knowledge and skills as rows 
and the task as columns.  The knowledge requirements network displayed in Table 35, 
indicates the skills or knowledge required for each task with a one.   
Table 35 - Knowledge Requirements Network 
Knowledge Surveillance Weapons Training Drive Bomb Preparation Bomb Connection Bomb Detonation
Weapons Expertise 0 1 0 0 0 1
Surveillance 1 0 0 1 1 0
Bomber Mindset 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electrical Engineer 0 0 0 0 1 0
Task
 
B.6 Resource Requirements Network 
 
Similar to the knowledge requirements network, the resource requirements network 
represents materials as rows and tasks as columns.  The resource requirements network 
accounts for the resources associate with each task, as seen in Table 36.  
Table 36 - Resource Requirements Network 
Materials Surveillance Weapons Training Drive Bomb Preparation Bomb Connection Bomb Detonation
Money 0 0 0 0 0 1
Facility 0 0 0 1 1 0
Truck 0 0 1 0 0 1
Bomb/Explosives 0 1 0 1 1 0
Task
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B.7 Precedence Network  
 
A one in this precedence matrix indicates that the task representing the column 
must be completed before the task represented in the row.  The precedence network 
shows the order in which tasks much be completed, shown in Table 37.  
Table 37 - Task Precedence Network 
Tasks Surveillance Weapons Training Drive Bomb Preparation Bomb Connection Bomb Detonation
Surveillance 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weapons Training 0 0 0 0 0 0
Drive 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bomb Preparation 0 1 0 0 0 0
Bomb Connection 0 0 0 1 0 0
Bomb Detonation 0 0 0 0 1 0
 
B.8 Locations  
 
Information contained in Table 38 includes the reported time and location of the 
members described in Section 4.5.  The unk included in bold represent important time 
periods when the unknown location of members was potentially important.  The non-
bolded unk is used for members who contributed little to the preparations and operation 
and therefore were not included in the analysis (Section 4.5).   
Table 38 - Location Matrix 
Spring 1993 Summer 1997 Spring-Summer 1998 Late July - Early Aug Attack
Osama Bin Laden unk unk Pakistan unk unk
Mamdouh Salim Khartoum, Sudan Khartoum, Sudan Bosnia unk unk
Ali Mohammed Khartoum, Sudan unk unk unk unk 
Wadih el-Hage Khartoum, Sudan Kenya unk United States United States
Abdullan Ahmed Abdullah Somalia Kenya unk Kenya Karachi, Pakistan
Khalid al-Fawwaz Kenya United Kingdom United Kingdom unk unk
Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah Somalia unk unk Kenya, Tanzania unk
Mohamed Sadeek Odeh Somalia Somalia Kenya Kenya Karachi, Pakistan
Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali unk Kenya Pakistan Kenya Kenya
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed Somalia Kenya Sudan, Kenya Kenya Kenya
Azzam unk Kenya Pakistan, Kenya Kenya Kenya
Fahad Mohammed Ally Msalam unk Kenya Tanzania Tanzania Karachi, Pakistan
Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil unk unk Tanzania Tanzania Karachi, Pakistan
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed unk unk Tanzania Tanzania Tanzania
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani unk unk Tanzania Tanzania Karachi, Pakistan
Hamden Khalif Allah Awad unk unk unk Tanzania Tanzania
Kherchtou unk unk unk unk unk 
Abouhalima unk unk unk unk unk 
 
 C-1 
Appendix C - Affiliation Weights Across Cultures 
 
 
The subject matter experts (SME), who provided the affiliation rank in the example 
in Section 4.3, were able to confirm the assertion in Section 3.2.1; the type of affiliation 
constituting a relationship, are valued approximately the same across cultures.  The 
SMEs, who have many years of intelligence experience, were able to provide affiliations 
values for the Muslim, Sub-Sahara and South American cultures.  Table 39 provides the 
ordinal ranking of the affiliations identified by Sageman for each culture.  
Table 39 - Multi-Cultural Ordinal Ranks of Affiliations 
Muslim Sub-Sahara South America
Nuclear Family 1 1 1
Extended Family 2 2 2
Friends 3 3 3
Worship 4 5 4
Discipleship 5 4 5
Extended Friends/ 
Acquaitances 6 6 6
 
 
Using the rank reciprocal rule, Equation (2.17), the weight associate with the rank of each 
affiliation for each culture, found in Table 39, is displayed in Table 40.  
Table 40 - Multi-Cultural Weight of Affiliations 
Muslim Sub-Sahara South America
Nuclear Family 0.41 0.41 0.31
Extended Family 0.20 0.20 0.31
Friends 0.14 0.14 0.14
Worship 0.10 0.08 0.10
Discipleship 0.08 0.10 0.08
Extended Friends/ 
Acquaitances 0.07 0.07 0.07
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Figure 14 provides a graphic depiction of weights for each affiliations and culture, based 
on the rank reciprocal rule.  
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Figure 14 - Multi-Cultural Values of Affiliations 
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